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The Law v. the IRA: The Effect of
Extradition Between the United Kingdom,
the Republic of Ireland and the United
States in Combatting the IRA
[U]ntil the British Government, which legislates for and sustains
the occupation of the six counties [of Northern Ireland], aban-
dons its futile military campaign, ends partition and recognizes
the Irish people's right to self-determination and democracy, the
I.R.A. will continue to strike whenever the opportunity arises.'
I. Introduction
On April 9, 1990, four British soldiers were killed near
Downpatrick, Northern Ireland in an Irish Republican Army (IRA)
bomb attack on the armored vehicle in which they were riding.2 On
June 25, an explosion, for which the IRA claimed responsibility, dev-
astated the Carlton Club in London.' Former British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher is a member of the Club, as are other senior
members of the ruling Conservative Party.4 The London Stock Ex-
change was damages by an IRA bomb on July 20.5 Three members
of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and Sister Catherine Dunn, a nun
in a passing car, were killed on July 24, 1990 near Armagh, North-
ern Ireland, when a bomb planted in the road by the IRA was deto-
nated by remote control." Ian Gow, a Conservative Member of Par-
liament and close personal friend of Mrs. Thatcher, condemned the
Armagh killings as futile and odious, saying, "[tihe message that
should go out fiom all decent people is that we will never, never
surrender to people like this."17 Five days later Mr. Gow was killed at
his home by a car bomb planted by the IRA. 8 Finally, in the deadli-
1. N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1980, at A3, col. 4. From a statement issued by the IRA claim-
ing responsibility for the "execution" of Ian Gow.
2. N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1990, at A3, col. I.
3. N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1990, at A3, col. I.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1990, at A5, col. I.
7. The Times (London), July 31, 1990, at I, col. I.
8. Id. Gow was the fourth sitting member of Parliament killed by IRA terrorists. Id.
Gow's murder has not weakened the resolve of the British government not to give in to the
IRA. Former Prime Minister Thatcher, speaking of Gow, said, "[ilf he could speak to me
now, he would say 'We fight that battle against them [the IRA] and we bring them to jus-
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est incident in Northern Ireland in the past two years, six British
soldiers and a civilian were killed on October 24 at security check-
points near Londonderry and Newry in Northern Ireland. 9 In the
Londonderry and Newry incidents the IRA held the families of al-
leged "collaborators" hostage and forced a male member of each
family to drive a car packed with explosives to security check-
points.1" 1990 has been a particularly bloody year in the IRA's bat-
tle, launched in 1969, to force the British out of Northern Ireland.
Terrorists, by definition, have contempt for the law." Yet civi-
lized states must abide by the law in combatting terrorism.' 2 A dem-
ocratic society cannot exist as such if its government disregards the
law. However, the ability of a government to bring to justice ter-
rorists who have committed acts of terrorism in its country is frus-
trated when the accused terrorist flees that state, and thus prevents
the state from exercising jurisdiction. Extradition is a means of
bringing fugitive offenders to justice,' 3 yet the use of extradition law
in its traditional form' has not always been effective in bringing
terrorists to justice. The British, especially, have been frustrated by
the failure of Ireland and the United States to extradite IRA mem-
bers to the United Kingdom.'5 Extradition laws have been revised in
response to the failure of traditional extradition law against the
IRA.
This Comment will examine the domestic legislation of and the
treaties between the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, and
the United States which provide for the extradition of fugitive of-
tice.' " Id.
9. N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1990, at Al, col. 2. Fourteen soldiers, two policemen, and at
least twenty-one civilians were wounded in the attacks.
10. Id.
II. An "act of terrorism" is defined by American Law as an activity that (A)
involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal
violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any
State; and (B) appears to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian popu-
lation: (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.
18 U.S.C. § 3077 (1984).
12. "'[I]n a democracy such as the United Kingdom violence should never be deemed an
acceptable part of the political process. To even permit courts in the United States to consider
political motives as justifying murder or other violent crimes showed a lack of respect for the
democratic process..." 132 CONG. REC. S9147 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (statement of Sena-
tor Lugar, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee).
13. "'Extradition may be sufficiently defined to be the surrender by one nation to another
of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside its own territory, and within the
territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try and to punish him, demands
the surrender." Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1901) (cited favorably in 18 HALS-
BURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND (4th ed. para. 201, n.l (1977)).
14. "Traditional form" here refers to extradition law which recognizes a broad political
offense exception to extradition, generally enacted before the increase in terrorism over the
past twenty years.
15. N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1990, at A3, col. 1.
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fenders. This Comment will begin with an examination of the extra-
dition law of the three states in its traditional form, that is, as recog-
nized before the start in 1969 of the IRA's terrorist campaign. It
will continue by discussing the reasons this law was an ineffective
tool against the IRA, and how this failure was the impetus for the
evolution of extradition law between the three states. The treaties
and legislation specifically aimed at combatting terrorism, drafted in
response to the failure of traditional extradition law, will then be
examined. This Comment will conclude by evaluating the effective-
ness of these instruments as used against the IRA.
II. Background
The United Kingdom formerly comprised Great Britain, that is
England, Scotland and Wales, and the whole of the island of Ire-
land. 16 The Republic of Ireland, originally called the Irish Free
State, was established as an independent state by a constitutional
process beginning in 1921, and comprises the twenty-six predomi-
nantly Roman Catholic counties of the island's thirty-two counties. 17
A majority of the population in the six predominantly Protestant
counties of the north wanted to remain part of the United Kingdom,
and Northern Ireland today remains a part of Her Majesty's domin-
ions and of the United Kingdom."8 A significant Catholic minority
exists in Northern Ireland, and hostilities between the Protestants
and Catholics have been the source of the continued state of virtual
civil war in Northern Ireland.' 9 While some legislative and executive
responsibility has devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly and
Executive, the Government of the United Kingdom retains control
over many important matters.20 For instance, Her Majesty's Secre-
tary of State for Northern Ireland, acting for the Government of the
United Kingdom, retains responsibilities for the international rela-
tions of Northern Ireland, including the conclusion of treaties.2' Spe-
16. Northern Ireland Constitution Act, 1973, ch. 36, § 1.
17. Id.; Groarke, Revolutionaries Beware: The Erosion of the Political Offense Excep-
tion Under the 1986 United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 136
U. PA. L. REV. 1515, 1532 (1988).
18. Northern Ireland Constitution Act, 1973, ch. 36, § I (reaffirming the Royal and
Parliamentary Titles Act, 1927, § 2(2), which provided that in every public document "United
Kingdom" should thereafter mean Great Britain and Northern Ireland); see also The Agree-
ment Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the Government of the Republic of Ireland on Northern Ireland, Nov. 15, 1985, 1985
U.K.T.S. No. 62 (Cmd. 9657), 24 I.L.M. 1582 [hereinafter Anglo-Irish Agreement]. The two
Governments .. .recognise that the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern
Ireland is for no change in the status of Northern Ireland . id. at A, art. l(b); Groarke,
supra note 15.
19. Groarke, supra note 17.
20. See Northern Ireland Constitution Act, 1973, ch. 36, § 2(l), (2).
21. Id. sched. 2, para. 3. However, the surrender of fugitives between Ireland and the
Republic is locally controlled. Id. sched. 2, para. 3(a). See The Backing of Warrants (Republic
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cial powers and provisions for dealing with terrorism or subversion
are also within the exclusive control of the Government of the
United Kingdom.22
The Constitution of the Republic of Ireland claims as the na-
tional territory of the State the whole island of Ireland, and seeks
the reintegration of the national territory of Ireland.23 The method
by which the national territory is to be reintegrated is a matter of
national policy and is exercised by the national government on the
authority of the Constitution.24 The Irish government recognizes the
current status of Northern Ireland as part of the U.K. and has cho-
sen to pursue the reintegration of the national territory by peaceful
and constitutional means.25
The Irish Republican Army also pursues a policy of reintegra-
tion of the national territory, but by force of arms.2" The IRA
"emerged" in 1918 out of the pre-independence civil strife in Ire-
land27 advocating a political philosophy of independence for the
whole of Ireland.2 Since independence was granted to the Irish Re-
public, the IRA has pursued a policy of reunification of Ireland, with
varying degrees of popular support.29 By 1969, "a state of civil disor-
der had been reached [in Northern Ireland] that had threatened the
viability of the Northern Irish government. As a consequence, the
Prime Minister [of Northern Ireland] requested assistance from the
United Kingdom and British troops were sent in to maintain or-
der.""0 In response to the army being sent in, as well as to Protestant
retaliation against Catholic civil rights activists, the provision IRA
(PIRA) was formed as a splinter group of the IRA. a" Since that
time, the claimed objective of the IRA, and more particularly of the
PIRA, has been "to inflict a military defeat [on the British in North-
of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, discussed infra p.5. The Backing of Warrants Act permits
judges in Northern Ireland to endorse warrants issued in the Republic of Ireland without re-
course to the Government of the United Kingdom); cf. The Extradition Treaty Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, June 8, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 229, T.I.A.S. No. 8468 [herein-
after 1972 Extradition Treaty) (extradition from or to the United States is conducted by the
Government of the United Kingdom, even for person wanted in, or found in, Northern Ire-
land); for a discussion of the 1972 Extradition Treaty, see infra p. 24-30.
22. Northern Ireland Constitution Act, 1973, ch. 36, sched. 1, para. 14.
23. IR. CONST., arts. I and 2; see also Russell v. Fanning, 1988 I.L.R.M. 333 (LEXIS,
Irelnd library, cases file, at 6), and Finucane v. McMahon, 1990 I.L.R.M. 505 (LEXIS, Irelnd
library, cases file, at 10).
24. IR. CONST., arts. 6(l), (2).
25. Anglo-Irish Agreement, supra note 18, at A, art. I.
26. Finucane v. McMahon, 1990 I.L.R.M. 505 (LEXIS, Irelnd library, cases file, at 8).
27. Walker, Political Violence and Democracy in Northern Ireland, 51 MOD. L. REV.
605, 608 (1988).
28. Finucane v. McMahon, 1990 I.L.R.M. 505 (LEXIS, Irelnd library, cases file, at 1I).
29. Id.
30. In re the Matter of Doherty by the Government of the United Kingdom, 599 F.
Supp. 270, 273, n.I (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
31. Groarke, supra note 17, at 1532.
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ern Ireland] or to demonstrate that the government of the area is
unable effectively to govern the area," forcing the British to relin-
quish control of Northern Ireland, and thus reunite the island.
32
Members of the Northern Ireland security forces, including the
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and British Army, as well as ci-
vilians have been the targets of IRA violence. 3 Between 1972 and
1979 the use of violence by the IRA and loyalist groups (groups sup-
porting the inclusion of Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom)
claimed over 1,770 lives, 1,300 of which were civilians.34 The United
Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, and the United States have rec-
ognized the IRA as a terrorist organization. 5
The violence has not abated. In the mid-1980s the IRA struck
up a friendship with Libya which has resulted in gifts of explosives,
guns, and cash from Col. Qaddafi.3 1 In 1988, the IRA launched a
new campaign of terror against the British in Great Britain and on
the European Continent, widening its targets to include military ba-
ses, politicians, and other representatives of the British establish-
ment. 7 In December, 1988 British authorities found a list of more
than 100 prominent figures, including Mrs. Thatcher, on an IRA
"death list" at a clandestine bomb factory in Campham, England.3
8
Also on the Capham hit-list was Ian Gow.39
III. Extradition Treaties and Legislation,
A. The United Kingdom and Ireland
1. The Backing of Warrants Act of 1965 and the Extradition
Act of 1965.-Extradition between the United Kingdom and Ireland
is conducted pursuant to domestic legislation of each state.4 0 The
United Kingdom's Backing of Warrants Act41 and Part III of the
32. Finucane v. McMahon, 1990 I.L.R.M. 505 (LEXIS, Irelnd library, cases file, at 11).
33. Groarke, supra note 17, at 1532; see also The Times (London), Aug. 1, 1990, at 2,
col. 1 (187 members of the Ulster Defense Regiment have been killed since 1969; fifteen peo-
ple murdered in a Belfast bar in 1971; eighteen soldiers killed at Warrenport, Northern Ire-
land, and Lord Mountbatten killed in 1979).
34. In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 273.
35. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1978, ch. 5, sched. 2 (the IRA is a
proscribed organization in the United Kingdom); Offenses Against the State Act, No. 13 (Ir.
1939) (the IRA is illegal in Ireland by virtue of Order SI No. 162 (1939) issued in pursuance
of the Act); Doherty v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 908 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990)
(citing UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE. PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1988, 33-
34, 74-75 (1989), stating that the IRA is a proscribed terrorist organization in the United
States).
36. The IRA: Spreading a Wider Net, ECONOMIST, June 23, 1990, at 52.
37. N.Y. Times, July 31, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45 [in the United King-
dom]; Extradition Act, No. 17 (Ir. 1965) [in the Republic of Ireland].
41. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45 (applies only to war-
rants issued in the Irish Republic. Id. Preamble).
Spring 1991]
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Irish Extradition Act 2 provide for the execution, in the state enact-
ing the legislation, of warrants of arrest issued in the other state.
Both Acts apply to offenses committed, or alleged to have been com-
mitted, before, -as well as after, the enactment of the Acts. 3 Since
both Acts were enacted prior to the commencement in 1969 of the
IRA terror campaign, the retroactive effect of the Acts has not been
at issue in extradition proceedings initiated under these Acts for
crimes committed since 1969.
The endorsement process under both Acts begins with the issu-
ance of a warrant by a judicial authority in one state for the arrest
of a person accused or convicted of an offense against the laws of
that state." Under the Backing of Warrants Act a British constable
must then make an application for the endorsement of the warrant
issued in Ireland to a justice of the peace in the United Kingdom, to
whom the constable must swear he has reason to believe the person
sought is in the area under the justice's jurisdiction. 45 The justice is
then obligated to endorse the warrant which may be executed only in
that part of the United Kingdom for which the justice acts."
In Ireland, the Commissioner of the Garda Siochdna (National
Police) receives the warrant and he, subject to certain provisions,
must endorse the warrant for execution if it appears to him that the
person sought may be found in Ireland. 47 Any member of the Garda
Siochdna may then execute the warrant anywhere in the State.48
Warrants endorsed for execution pursuant to the Backing of War-
rants Act and the Extradition Act are treated in the state requested
as if they were originally issued by a judicial authority of that
state. 49
In the United Kingdom, a magistrate's obligatory endorsement
of a properly produced warrant is not subject to second guessing, and
mandates the arrest of the person sought.5" Determinations as to
42. Extradition Act, No. 17, §§ 41, 43 (Ir. 1965). The Extradition Act is the extradition
law of Ireland. Part I deals with preliminary matters. Part I1 covers the general extradition
law in regard to international agreements and conventions, and provides for their enactment
into domestic legislation. Part Ill provides for the endorsement and execution of warrants
issued by judicial authorities in Northern Ireland, England, Scotland, and Wales. Id. § 41.
43. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § 13(3); Extradition
Act, No. 17, § ](2), (Ir. 1965).
44. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § l(1)(a); Extradition
Act, No. 17, § 43(l)(a), (Ir. 1965).
45. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § l(l)(b).
46. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § l(1)(b). A "part of
the United Kingdom" refers to England and Wales, Scotland, or Northern Ireland. Id. §
10(2).
47. Extradition Act, No. 17, § 43(l)(b), (Ir. 1965). Contra id. §§ 25, 26 which require a
formal application process.
48. id. § 43(2).
49. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § 1(4); Extradition
Act, No. 17, § 43(2) (Ir. 1965).
50. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § 1. "Person sought"
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whether extradition is for some reason precluded in a particular case
are not made until a later time.5 1 In Ireland, however, a warrant sent
to the Commissioner for endorsement shall not be endorsed by the
Minister of Justice, or the High Court, if the issue is referred to it,
so directs.52 An order not to endorse the warrant for execution shall
be given where the Minister or the High Court is of the opinion that
the offense charged in the warrant is a political offense or an offense
connected with a political offense.53 The Minister or the High Court
may also give an order not to endorse where there are substantial
reasons for believing that the person sought, if returned to the re-
questing state, will be prosecuted for a political offense or an offense
connected with a political offense.54
Upon being arrested pursuant to the endorsed warrant, the per-
son claimed is brought before either a magistrate's court in the
United Kingdom or a district court in Ireland.5 5 after receiving the
arrestee, a magistrate's court in the United Kingdom generally must
order the arrestee to be delivered over the to Garda Siochna.5 It is
at this point, however, that the magistrate must determine whether
the offense charged is a political offense and thus non-extraditable.57
If the magistrate determines the political offense exception does not
apply, she must remand the person claimed either in custody or on
bail until delivered. 8 If a district justice in Ireland is not available,
the Extradition Act provides that a person claimed may be brought
before a local peace commissioner who shall remand the fugitive of-
fender in custody or on bail until a district justice can make the
order to deliver him over to the United Kingdom.59 After the district
justice makes his delivery order he must remand the fugitive in cus-
tody or on bail. 0 It seems unwise to grant bail to a fugitive from
justice, especially one accused or convicted of terrorist activity. In
order to ensure the delivery of a fugitive terrorist to the requesting
state, bail should not be granted.6"
and "person claimed" mean a person whose extradition is requested. Extradition Act, No. 17,
§ 3(l), (Ir. 1965).
51. See infra text accompanying note 58.
52. Extradition Act, No. 17, § 44(l) (Ir. 1965).
53. Id. § 44(2)(a). The section also permits an order prohibiting endorsement when the
offense charged is "(b) an offense under military law which is not an offense under ordinary
criminal law, or (c) a revenue offense." The political offense is the only exception relevant to
this discussion. The political offense exception is discussed infra pp. 7-13.
54. Extradition Act, No. 17, § 44(2) (Ir. 1965).
55. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § 2(l); Extradition
Act, No. 17, § 45(2) (Ir. 1965).
56. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § 2(l).
57. Id. § 2(2).
58. Id. §§ 2(l), 5(l)(a)(b).
59. Extradition Act, No. 17, §§ 45(3), 46(l) (Ir. 1965).
60. Id. § 47(l).
61. Carron v. McMahon, 1989 Nos. 139 and 146 (Transcript), 6 April 1990 (LEXIS,
Spring 1991]
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Both the Backing of Warrants Act and the Extradition Act pro-
vide that a fugitive on remand awaiting extradition may not be deliv-
ered for fifteen days. 2 During this period of time the person re-
manded may petition the courts- for a write of habeas corpus, and
may not be delivered up while his petition is pending.63 A fugitive
detained in the United Kingdom may raise the political offense ex-
ception on a petition for habeas corpus even though the political of-
fense issue has been previously considered by the magistrate who or-
dered the fugitive's surrender. 4 A fugitive awaiting extradition in
Ireland may also petition the court for release from detention on
grounds relating to the political offense exception. 5 Persons arrested
and remanded pending delivery under the both the Backing of War-
rants Act and the Extradition Act, then, are provided two opportuni-
ties for review of their case on the political offense issue. 66
The "political offense exception" is not a single exception to ex-
tradition. Rather, the term encompasses many defenses to extradi-
tion that are grounded in the political nature of the offense commit-
ted or alleged to have been committed. The most general
embodiment of the exception is found in the Backing of Warrants
Act, which directs that a magistrate's court shall not order an Irish
fugitive to be delivered over to the Garda Siochdna if it is shown "to
the satisfaction of the court" that "the offence specified in the war-
rant is an offence of a political character."6 7 Similarly, an Irish court
or the Minister of Justice may release a person arrested in Ireland if
either "is of the opinion that . . . the offense to which the warrant
relates is . . . a political offence."6 8 Refusing extradition on the
grounds of the "political offense exception," as developed in the late
19th century by the courts of Great Britain, was viewed as analogous
to granting "political asylum" or "political refuge" to a person who
Ireland library, cases file). Owen Carron was granted bail in Northern Ireland after being
charged with a weapons possession offense, but fled to the Republic before being tried. James
Maguire, the passenger in Carron's car who had actual possession of the firearms, was not
granted bail and was tried and convicted by the Northern Irish courts. Id. at I.
62. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § 3(l)(a); Extradition
Act, No. 17, § 48(2) (Ir. 1965).
63. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, §3(l)(b); Extradition
Act, No. 17, § 48(2) (Ir. 1965).
64. R. v. Governor of Winson Green Prison, Birmingham, ex parte Littlejohn, [19751 3
All E.R. 208 (Q.B.).
65. Extradition Act, No. 17, § 48(2) (Ir. 1965).
66. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, §§ 2(l)(2); 3()(b);
Extradition Act, No. 17, §§ 44(l)(2) (Ir. 1965). See also R v. Governor of Winson Green
Prison, Birmingham, ex parte Littlejohn, [1975] 3 All E.R. 208 (Q.B.).
67. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, §2(2)(a). This section
also disallows a delivery order if it is shown that the offense specified is an offense "under
military law which is not an offence under the general criminal law, or an offence under an
enactment relating to taxes, duties or exchange control." Cf. Extradition Act, No. 17, §
44(2)(a) (Ir. 1965).
68. Extradition Act, No. 17, § 50(1), (2)(a)(i) (Ir. 1965).
[Vol. 9:2
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had committed an offense in furtherance of his design to escape from
a political regime he had found intolerable. 69 Yet, as the use of vio-
lence by those in political opposition to governments has escalated
and become more random this century, courts have found it increas-
ingly difficult to define "political offenses." Because the changing na-
ture of violence used by groups in opposition has made it more diffi-
cult to draw a line between terrorism and the use of force as a
legitimate form of political opposition, the effective operation of ex-
tradition regimes which recognize the political offense exception
have been severely handicapped: the political offense exception has
become a legal loophole through which terrorists can escape justice.
The Irish Supreme Court, instead of deciding what constitutes a
political offense, has determined that an offense cannot properly be
considered political in nature if the purpose of the act is "to subvert
the [Irish] Constitution or usurp the functions of the organs of State
established by the Constitution."7 However, the Court has held that
although the objective of the IRA is the reintegration of the national
territory "by force of arms," in opposition to the peaceful method
decided upon by the Irish government, membership in the IRA of a
fugitive offender alone is not enough to take his actions outside the
protection of the political offense exception. 71 At the opposite ex-
69. Schtraks v. Government of Israel and Others, [19621 3 All E.R. 529, 540 (H.L.)
(per Viscount Radcliffe).
In my opinion the idea that lies behind the phrase "offence of a political
character" is that the fugitive is at odds with the state that applies for his extra-
dition on some issue connected with the political control or government of the
country ... It is this idea that the judges were seeking to express in the two
early cases of Re Castioni [1891] I Q.B. 149 and Re Meunier [1894] 2 Q.B.
415 when they connected a political offence with an uprising, a disturbance, an
insurrection, a civil war or struggle for power: an in my opinion it is still neces-
sary to maintain that connexion [sic].
Id. at 540.
70. Finucane v. McMahon, 1990 I.L.R.M. 505 (LEXIS, Irelnd library, cases file, at 9)
(quoting Russell v. Fanning, 1988 I.L.R.M. 333 (LEXIS, Irelnd library, cases file). In Russell
the Supreme Court began its consideration of the applicability of the political offense excep-
tion to the case with a presumption that the Oireachtas (Parliament), in passing the Extradi-
tion Act, could not have intended the provisions of the Act, including the political offense
exception, to offend the Constitution. Pursuant to articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the Constitution,
decisions as to the method for achieving the reintegration of the national territory are matters
for the Government, and that the carrying out of those decisions is exercisable only by or on
the authority of the Government. The Court continued that while any person or group is enti-
tled to advocate any particular policy of reintegration, a person or group which takes over or
seeks to take over the carrying out of a policy of reintegration themselves, without the author-
ity of the Government, is, by their actions, subverting the Constitution and usurping the func-
tions of the organs of State. This principle was first set out by the Supreme Court in Quinn v.
Wrenn, 1985 I.R. 322. The principle that offenses, the purpose of which is to subvert the
Constitution and usurp the powers of the State, may not be considered political offenses has
been recognized as manifestly correct in subsequent cases. Finucane v. McMahon, 1990
I.L.R.M. 505 (LEXIS, Irelnd library, cases file, at 9). Each extradition case must be decided
on its own particular facts and circumstance. Id. (LEXIS, Irelnd library, cases file, at 10).
71. Finucane v. McMahon, 1990 I.L.R.M. 505 (LEXIS, Irelnd library, cases file, at 9);
compare Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981) where the court noted that
simply noting membership in the PLO, but not tying the membership to the
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treme, the Irish Supreme Court has suggested that since indiscrimi-
nate attacks and killings of the civilian population are contrary to
international law and the laws of war, and can be classified as crimes
against humanity even if they have a political objective, persons
committing such crimes should not be permitted to avail themselves
of the protection of the political offense exception .72 The legal loop-
hole through which terrorists may escape justice is found in the no-
man's land between the extremes of mere membership in a terrorist
organization and the indiscriminate killing of civilians.
On September 25, 1983, Dermot Finucane, a member of the
IRA, escaped from the Maze Prison in Northern Ireland where he
was serving an eighteen year sentence on a firearms offense.73 In
1987 twenty warrants for his arrest were issued in Northern Ireland
for offenses alleged to have been committed by him in the course of
his escape.7 ' The Commissioner of the Garda Siochina endorsed the
warrants, and Finucane was arrested and brought before a district
justice who ordered his extradition to Northern Ireland. 75 Pursuant
to section 50 of the Extradition Act, Finucane brought proceedings
in the High Court seeking his release on the grounds that the of-
fenses to which the warrants related were political offenses. 76 The
court then held that since the IRA is a group which is carrying out a
policy of national reintegration without the authority of the govern-
ment, IRA members whose extradition is sought by the United
Kingdom cannot avail themselves of the protection of the political
offense exception in section 50 of the Act. 77 The High Court held
that because Finucane is a member of the IRA he could not avail
himself of the political offense exception, and that he should be ex-
tradited to Northern Ireland. 71 On appeal the Supreme Court re-
versed.7' The Court reaffirmed the doctrine that activities subversive
of the Irish Government and usurpacious of the government function
cannot properly be held to be political offenses, and are therefore
specific act alleged was insufficient to satisfy the burden petitioner must shoulder
in order to invoke the political offense exception. Absent a direct tie between the
PLO and the specific act of violence alleged, the act involved here, without more,
was not the sort which may be reasonably 'incidental to' a political disturbance.
Id. at 520.
72. Finucane v. McMahon, 1990 I.L.R.M. 505 (LEXIS, Irelnd library, cases file, at 14,
15).
73. Id. (LEXIS, Irlnd library, cases file, at 3).
74. Id. (LEXIS, Irlnd library, cases file, at 7).
75. Id.; This procedure was followed pursuant to Extradition Act, No. 17, § 45(2) (Ir.
1965).
76. Finucane v. McMahon, 1990 I.L.R.M. 505 (LEXIS, Irelnd library, cases file, at 7,
8); see supra text accompanying note 68.
77. Finucane v. McMahon, 1990 I.L.R.M. 505 (LEXIS, Irelnd library, cases file, at 6).
78. Id. (LEXIS, Irlnd library, cases file at 8).
79. Id.
[Vol. 9:2
EXTRADITION AND THE IRA
extraditable.8 0 Yet the court, reversing a prior case, held that
[t]he fact that the policy or activities followed by persons
outside the jurisdiction of the State is opposed to or contrary to
the policy adopted by the, government of Ireland in relation to
the unity of the country is not . . . sufficient to equate it to a
policy to overthrow this State or to subvert the Constituion [sic]
of this State.8
The Court concluded that the firearms possession offenses of which
Finucane was originally convicted would have qualified as political
offenses and that the offenses for which his extradition was being
sought were so related to the firearms offenses as to qualify as politi-
cal offenses. 2 Therefore, Finucane's petition for release under sec-
tion 50 was granted, and a convicted IRA terrorist was set free.83
In the United Kingdom a magistrate shall not order a fugitive
offender delivered to the Garda Siochdna if it is shown to the satis-
faction of the court that the offense charged is of a political charac-
ter.84 The motivation of the wrongdoer is highly relevant in deter-
mining whether an offense is of a political character. 85 The
wrongdoer must have had some "direct ulterior motive of a political
kind" when she committed the act for it to be classified as a political
offense. 86 In Ex Parte Littlejohn87 the petitioner, a member of the
IRA, was accused in Ireland of participating in an armed robbery in
Ireland organized by, and for the purpose of obtaining money for,
the IRA.88 Pursuant to the Backing of Warrants Act the petitioner
was arrested in England on an Irish arrest warrant endorsed in Eng-
land. 9 After a magistrate ordered Littlejohn extradited to Ireland,9"
the magistrate remanded Littlejohn in custody for fifteen days91 dur-
ing which the Littlejohn exercised his right under section 3 of the
Backing of Warrants Act to apply for a writ of habeas corpus. 92 Lit-
tlejohn sought relief on the grounds that the robbery of which he was
80. Id. (LEXIS, Irlnd library, cases file at 9).
81. Finucane v. McMahon, 1990 I.L.R.M. 505 (LEXIS, lrelnd library, cases file, at 16).
82. Id. (LEXIS, Irlnd library, cases file at 17).
83. Id.
84. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § 2(2)(a).
85. R. Governor of Winson Green Prison, Birmingham, ex parte Littlejohn, [1975] 3 All
E.R. 208, 211 (Q.B.).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 209.
89. R v. Governor of Winson Green Prison, Birmingham, ex parte Littlejohn, [1975] 3
All E.R. 208, 209 (Q.B.); see Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45,
§1.
90. See Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § 2.
91. See id. § 3(l)(a).
92. R v. Governor of Winson Green Prison, Birmingham, ex parte Littlejohn, [1975] 3
All E.R. 208, 209 (Q.B.); see Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, §
3(1)(b).
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accused was a political offense and therefore non-extraditable.9 3 In
denying his writ and ordering his extradition, the court held that
although . . . Littlejohn "had been concerned with the IRA, and
although . . . [his] interest in robbing this bank was not simply to
obtain money on . . . [his] own account, yet that was not a sufficient
political association to make the offence an offence of a political
character within the Act. 94
The standard by which a magistrate determines whether the po-
litical offense exception is available is whether, accepting all that the
applicant has said, it is a case where a reasonable court must come
to the conclusion that there are substantial grounds for believing the
fugitive will be prosecuted for a political offense.9 5 The magistrates,
however, are not to inquire into the merits of the offender's charges
that the offense committed was of a political character.9" The Sched-
ule to the Backing of Warrants Act provides that "proceedings shall
be conducted as nearly as may be in the like manner, as if the court
were acting as examining justices inquiring into an indictable offence
alleged to have been committed by that person." 97 This does not re-
quire any inquiry as to the merits of the charges against the fugitive
which he claims are political offenses. 98
The Extradition Act, but not the Backing of Warrants Act, also
allows for the inclusion in the general "political offense exception" of
those offenses connected with a political offense. 99 An offense does
not necessarily need to be of a political nature in order to be capable
of being connected with an offense of a political nature within the
meaning of the clause.100 The test is whether there is a "causal or
factual relationship of sufficient strength to be described as a connec-
tion between the two offenses concerned. 10 1
The Supreme Court applies this test in Carron v. McMahon.02
In December, 1985 The RUC arrested Owen Carron and a passen-
ger in his car, James Maguire, in Northern Ireland when the RUC
found Maguire in possession of an assault rifle and ammunition.1 03
Both Carron and Maguire were charged with firearms offenses, but
93. R v. Governor of Winson Green Prison, Birmingham, ex parte Littlejohn, [19751 3
All E.R. 208, 209-10 (Q.B.).
94. Id. at 211.
95. Keane v. Governor of Brixton Prison, [1971] 1 All E.R. 1163, 1167 (H.L.).
96. Id.
97. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, sched. para. 3.
98. Keane v. Governor of Brixton Prison, [1971] 1 All E.R. 1163, 1167 (H.L.).
99. Extradition Act, No. 17, § 50(2)(a)(i) (Jr. 1965).
100. Carron v. McMahon, 1989 Nos. 139 and 146 (Transcript), 6 April 1990 (LEXIS,
Irelnd library, cases file).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. (LEXIS, Irlnd library, cases file, at I).
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only Carron was granted bail."0 4 Carron skipped bail and fled to the
Republic before he could be tried in Northern Ireland.1"5 In Novem-
ber, 1987, judicial authorities in Northern Ireland issued warrants
for Carron's arrest, which were subsequently endorsed in Ireland by
the Deputy Commissioner of the Garda Siochdna, pursuant to sec-
tion 43 of the Extradition Act.1"6 After his arrest, Carron was
brought before a district justice who ordered Carron's extradition. 10 7
Carron petitioned the High Court for release under section 50 of the
Extradition Act which permits the Minister of the High Court to
order the release of an arrested person if either is of the opinion that
the offense to which a warrant relates is an offense connected with a
political offense.108 The High Court granted the relief sought, and on
appeal the Supreme Court was first required to determine whether
Maguire's offense was a political offense.109 Concluding that
Maguire's possession of firearms was a political offense, the court
found that the connection between Maguire's offense and those with
which Carron was charged was sufficiently strong to allow Carron to
avail himself of the political offense exception.110 The Court refused
to extradite Carron to Northern Ireland where a judicial authority
had already determined that Carron should be tried for offenses
against the laws of Northern Ireland. The "connected with a politi-
cal offense" clause has widened the political offense loophole. One
wonders how tenuous a connection courts would allow before con-
nected offenses would no longer be exempted. The "connected with a
political offense" clause does not aid in the crackdown on terrorism.
Both the Backing of Warrants Act and the Extradition Act pro-
vide, under the "political offense exception" umbrella, that a fugitive
offender may not be extradited when the court reviewing his case
finds substantial grounds for believing that he will, if removed from
the requested state, be prosecuted or detained for an offense other
than that specified in the warrant, that other offense being a political
offense.1 The Irish Supreme Court has interpreted this clause to
mean that Ireland should not order delivery to the United Kingdom
under the Extradition Act "if it was established as a matter of
probability that the real purpose of the delivery was not to bring the
104. Carron v. McMahon, 1989 Nos. 139 and 146 (Transcript), 6 April 1990 (LEXIS,
Irelnd library, cases file, at 1).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.; see Extradition Act, No. 17 (1965), § 47.
108. Carron v. McMahon, 1989 Nos. 139 and 146 (Transcript), 6 April 1990 (LEXIS,
lrelnd library, cases file, at 2); see Extradition Act, No. 17, § 50(l), (2)(a)(i) (Ir. 1965).
109. Carron v. McMahon, 1989 Nos. 139 and 146 (Transcript), 6 April 1990 (LEXIS,
Irelnd library, cases file, at 2).
110. Id.
I ll. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § 2(2)(b), Extradi-
tion Act, No. 17, §,50(2)(b) (Ir. 1965).
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person delivered before a court so as to charge him with an offense
• . . but rather to interrogate him."' 12 The British courts have inter-
preted this clause similarly. In Keane v. Governor of Brixton
Prison,"3 Keane, who had been politically active all his life and was
a former member of the IRA, was wanted in Ireland for the murder
of a member of the Garda S-rioch-rana and for armed robbery.1 1 4
Keane was arrested in England on -a provisional warrant' 6 at the
request of the Irish, and was ordered extradited by the magistrate
before whom he was brought. 1 6 While on remand in custody pend-
ing his extradition, Keane applied for a write of habeas corpus
claiming that the magistrate's extradition order was contrary to sec-
tion 2(2)(b) of the Backing of Warrants Act." 7 Specifically, Keane
argued that the new political organization he had recently founded
in the Republic of Ireland may become illegal in the Republic some-
time in the future and that if he persisted in his political activities,
his actions would then be political offenses." 8 The Divisional Court
refused Keane's application, but granted him leave to appeal to the
House of Lords." 9 In refusing to extend the protection of section
2(2)(b) of the Backing of Warrants Act to Keane, the Lords held
the section would only give protection "if there were a likelihood of
prosecution or detention for a political offense whether in substitu-
tion for or in addition to the non-political offenses charged in the
warrants.' 20 The House of Lords held Keane's application was cor-
rectly refused and permitted his extradition' 2 '
In cases of urgency, provisional warrants are permitted to be
issued by both the Backing of Warrants Act and the Extradition
Act. 2 2 The requirement for issuance of a provisional warrant under
both Acts is three-fold. A justice of the peace in the United King-
dom or a justice of the District Court in Ireland must receive a
sworn application from either a constable or member of the Garda
112. Russell v. Fanning, 1988 I.L.R.M. 333 (LEXIS, Irelnd library, cases file, at 10).
113. [1971] 1 All E.R. 1163 (H.L.).
114. Id. at 1165.
115. For a discussion of provisional warrants, see infra p. 13.
116. Keane v. Governor of Brixton Prison, [19711 1 All E.R. 1163, 1165 (H.L.); see
Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § 2(2)(b).
117. Keane, [1971] 1 All E.R. at 1165; see Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland)
Act, 1965, ch. 45, § 2(1); Keane applied for writ of habeas corpus as of right under Backing of
Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § 3(l)(b).
118. Keane, [19711 1 All E.R. at 1167. "In other words . . . [the petitioner] is really
saying: I am a political animal, I am watched very closely, and if I carry on my political
activities, as I am going to, I may from time to time be detained." Id. at 1168.
119. Id. at 1166.
120. Id. at 1168. "It is not enough to show that the applicant if returned to his own
country is likely so to conduct himself in the future that he will bring on himself prosecution or
detention for future political offenses or alleged political offenses." Id.
121. Id.
122. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § 4; Extradition Act,
No. 17, § 49 (Ir. 1965).
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Siochdna, respectively, (1) that she has reason to believe a warrant
has been issued by a judicial authority in the state which will eventu-
ally request extradition, but that the warrant is not yet in her posses-
sion, (2) that she has received a request made on the ground of ur-
gency by or on behalf of the other state, and (3) that she has reason
to believe the person may be found in the requested state. 23 If the
person sought is in the United Kingdom, the justice of the peace
may issue a provisional warrant for execution in the part of the
United Kingdom in which the justice sits, or if the person is in Ire-
land, the district justice may issue the provisional warrant for execu-
tion anywhere in Ireland. 24 The warrants last five days.'25 If the
justice in the requested state receives the warrant issued in the re-
questing state (the "original warrant") and properly endorses it
before the arrest, upon the arrest of the person sought, the extradi-
tion process will proceed as if the arrest were made on an endorsed
warrant. 26 If the original warrant is not produced by the time the
fugitive offender is arrested and brought before the justice, the fugi-
tive must be remanded, in custody or on bail, for no more than three
days. 127 If, at the end of the three day remand period, the justice has
still not received the original warrant, the justice must order the fu-
gitive released. 28 A justice should not grant bail to a person arrested
on a provisional warrant as the circumstances of his arrest, by the
very nature of a provisional warrant, are urgent. This is especially
true of fugitive terrorists, who have already fled justice, and would
most likely do so again.
2. The Suppression of Terrorism Act of 1978.-British frus-
tration with the political offense "loophole" led the United Kingdom,
in 1978, to enact domestic legislation giving effect to the European
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, to which it was a
party. 29 The Backing of Warrants Act sets out the general law for
extradition to Ireland, and the British may extradite any criminal
wanted in Ireland under its provisions. 30 The Suppression of Terror-
123. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § 4(l); Extradition
Act, No. 17, § 49(l) (Jr. 1965).
124. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § 4(2); Extradition
Act, No. 17, § 49(8) (Jr. 1965).
125. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § 4(2); Extradition
Act, No. 17, § 49(8) (Jr. 1965).
126. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § 4(3)(a); Extradi-
tion Act, No. 17, § 49(5) (Jr. 1965).
127. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § 4(3)(b); Extradi-
tion Act, No. 17, § 49(6) (Jr. 1965).
128. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § 4(3)(b); Extradi-
tion Act, No. 17, § 49(6) (Jr. 1965).
129. Suppression of Terrorism Act, 1978, ch. 26.
130. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § I (I)(a). Applies to
warrants issued "for the arrest of a person accused or convicted of an offence against the laws
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ism Act, however, is specifically aimed at the extradition of
terrorists.
The most important characteristic of the Suppression of Terror-
ism Act, as regards the establishment of an effective system for the
extradition of terrorists, is its limitation of those offenses which may
be regarded as of a political character."' Unlike the Backing of
Warrants Act, under which British courts did not inquire into the
merits of the charges against the fugitive offender and made no inde-
pendent determination as to the legality of a person's actions, the
Suppression of Terrorism Act requires the courts to determine
whether the actions constitute offenses under the law of the United
Kingdom . 32 Additionally, the focus of the court is on the act consti-
tuting the offense.13 3 The term by which the offense is referred to in
the requesting state is not determinative of whether the Act applies,
but rather it is the "conduct of the accused which is the test. ' '" 3' The
motivation of the terrorist is no longer relevant as it was under the
Backing of Warrants Act. 3 5
The Act provides that for the purposes of the Backing of War-
rants Act, offenses listed in Schedule One of the Act should not be
regarded as offenses of a political character. 36 Among those offenses
which courts may no longer consider political offenses are murder,
manslaughter, kidnapping, false imprisonment, assault, and certain
firearms and explosives offenses.'3 Thus, while under the Backing of
Warrants Act the murder of a British soldier or of a Member of
Parliament could arguably have been considered a political offense,
under the Suppression of Terrorism Act no type of murder may be
considered political. In addition, a terrorist accused or convicted of
murder or possession of firearms with the intent to injure, could not
avail herself of the political offense exception regardless of her moti-
vation. Under such terms, however, it also seems that a person who,
of the Republic, being an indictable offence or an offence punishable on summary conviction
with imprisonment for six months."
131. Suppression of Terrorism Act, 1978, ch. 26, § I.
132. Id. § I(I); see Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, §
i(I)(a).
133. Suppression of Terrorism Act, 1978, ch. 26, § 1(I).
134. United States Government v. McCaffery, [1984] 2 All E.R. 571, 573 (H.L.) (per
Lord Diplock).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 85 & 86.
136. Suppression of Terrorism Act, 1978, ch. 26, § 1(2)(a), (3)(c).
137. Id..§ l(2)(a), sched. 1, paras. I (murder), 2 (manslaughter or culpable homicide),
4 (kidnapping, abduction or plagium), 5 (false imprisonment), 6 (assault occasioning actual
bodily harm or causing injury), 12 (causing gunpowder to explode causing bodily injury or
with the intent to do grievous bodily injury, or placing gunpowder near a building with the
intent to cause bodily injury), 13 (causing explosion likely to endanger life or property, or
doing an act with an intent to cause an explosion, including making or possessing explosives
with intent to endanger life or property), 14 (possession of a firearm with intent to injure, or
using a firearm to resist arrest), 15 (possession of a firearm or ammunition with intent by
means thereof to endanger life, or to enable another person to endanger life).
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in the course of a domestic uprising, the purpose of which was to
establish a more democratic government, killed a member of the
government incidental to the general uprising, could not avail him-
self to the political offense exception. The government against whom
he revolted would then be able to secure his return and prosecute
him for his participation in the uprising. The purpose of the political
offense exception as traditionally recognized would thereby be
frustrated.138
The Suppression of Terrorism Act does not eliminate all protec-
tion to the politically oppressed. The Act amends the Backing of
Warrants Act by adding two grounds on which the magistrate may
refuse to issue an order for delivery of the fugitive to the Garda
Siochdna. 130 An order shall not be issued if it is shown to the satis-
faction of the court that there are reasonable grounds for believing
(1) "that the warrant was in fact issued in order to secure the return
of the person named . . . in it to the Republic for the purpose of
prosecuting him on account of his race, religion, nationality or politi-
cal opinions; or " (2) "that he would, if returned there, be prejudiced
at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty
by reason of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions."' 40
So, in the hypothetical given above, if the court found substantial
grounds for believing the warrant issued for the fugitive's arrest was
in fact aimed at securing his return so that the government could
prosecute him for his anti-government opinion, the court would not
surrender the fugitive. The court must be satisfied, however, that
there are substantial grounds for believing the fugitive will in fact be
prosecuted for his political opinions.141 Therefore, terrorists accused
of acts of violence may not so easily avail themselves of this defense.
Section four of the Suppression of Terrorism Act permits the
United Kingdom to exercise jurisdiction over persons who have com-
mitted crimes in any other convention country.' 2 A person who has
committed an act in a convention country, which act would have
made the offender guilt of certain offenses if it had been committed
138. In Re Castioni, [1891] I Q.B. 149, 168 (per Judge Hawkins); see supra text ac-
companying note 69.
139. Suppression of Terrorism Act, 1978, ch. 26, § 2(2).
140. id., adding provisions (e)(i) and (ii) to Backing of Warrants Act, 1965, ch. 45, §
2(2). Cf. Extradition Act, No. 17, § 11(2) (Jr. 1965) which provides extradition shall not be
granted
if there are substantial grounds for believing that a request for extradition
for an ordinary criminal offence has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or
punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality or political opin-
ion or that that person's position may be prejudiced for any of those reasons.
Yet this section is in Part II of the Extradition Act, and therefore not applicable to the United
Kingdom.
141. Suppression of Terrorism Act, 1978, ch. 26, § 2(2).
142. Id. § 4.
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in the United Kingdom; will be guilty of that offense in the United
Kingdom.143 If for some reason the extradition requested of the
United Kingdom pursuant to this Act should fail, the United King-
dom could conceivably prosecute the fugitive offender found within
its territory in its courts. This section further provides that the term
"in a convention country" applies to the ships, aircraft, and hover-
craft registered in a convention country. 14 4 Thus, under this section,
acts committed aboard ships at sea, or airplanes in flight may fall
under the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. Although the IRA
preys almost entirely on land targets, other terrorist organizations
have targeted ships and airplanes, and there is no guarantee that the
IRA will not change targets.
Ireland was not an original signatory to the European Conven-
tion on the Suppression of Terrorism, and did not become a party
until 1987.145 The British Secretary of State is empowered to apply
section 4 of the Act to the Republic at any time the Republic is not
a party to the Convention.'" Yet between 1978 and 1985 the United
Kingdom did not order the Act applicable to Ireland, or any other
country.14 7 Thus, while the political offense exception was abated as
a defense to extradition from the United Kingdom to Ireland, the
political offense "loophole" was still recognized in Ireland. The Brit-
ish were offended and gravely concerned about the continued availa-
bility in Ireland of the political offense exception to terrorists wanted
in the United Kingdom. 148 British authorities expressed concern that
the continued recognition of the political offense exception was mak-
ing it easier for Ireland to be used as a refuge by the IRA."'
In 1985 the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Re-
public of Ireland concluded an agreement on Northern Ireland.' 50
By the terms of the Anglo-Irish Agreement an Intergovernmental
Conference was established through which the Irish government may
put forward its views and proposals concerning Northern Irish affairs
relating to political, security, and legal matters, as well as to the
promotion of cross-border cooperation.' 51 Among those legal matters
with which the Conference is to be concerned is extradition. 52 In
143. Id.
144. Id. § 4(7).
145. Extradition (Suppression of Terrorism) Act, No. I (fr. 1987).
146. Suppression of Terrorism Act, 1978, ch. 26, § 5(2).
147. Suppression of Terrorism Act, 1978, ch. 26 § 5.
148. Patrick Ryan: No Go, ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 1988, at 63, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Apr.
10, 1990, at A3, col. I.
149. N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1990, a A3, col. I; "The Irish Republic was perceived in
Britain as a safe haven for terrorists, Mr. Ian Gow . . . said yesterday in a [House of] Com-
mons Easter adjournment debate .... " The Time (London), Apr. 6, 1990, at 7, col. I.
150. Anglo-Irish Agreement, supra note 18.
151. Id. B, art. 2, paras. (a), (b).
152. Id. E, art. 8.
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this regard, then Taoiseach (Prime Minister of Ireland) Garret Fitz-
Gerald stated that his government intended to accede as soon as pos-
sible to the European Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism."5 3
3. The Extradition (Suppression of Terrorism) Act of 1987
and the Extradition (Amendment) Act of 1987.-In December,
1987, the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament) passed legislation giving ef-
fect to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. 5 '
The Irish Suppression of Terrorism Act does not supersede previous
legislation, but rather amends and qualifies the 1965 Extradition
Act. 5" Like the British Suppression of Terrorism Act, the Irish Sup-
pression of Terrorism Act limits those offenses which may be consid-
ered political in nature. 156 Part III of the Extradition Act concerns
the endorsement and execution in Ireland of warrants issued in the
United Kingdom. 5" For the purposes of Part III of the Extradition
Act, certain offenses listed in the 1987 Act may not be regarded as
political offenses or offenses connected with political offenses. 158 Al-
though both the British and Irish Suppression of Terrorism Acts
were enacted to give effect to the European Convention, important
differences exist between the two Acts.
The difference between the British and Irish Suppression of
Terrorism Acts which has proved to be the most significant and
damaging in the fight against the IRA involves retroactivity. The
British Suppression of Terrorism Act allows retroactive application
of the limitation on those offenses which may be considered politi-
cal. 159 Yet as concerns warrants endorsed pursuant to Part III of the
Extradition Act, the limitation imposed by the Irish Suppression of
Terrorism Act of 1987 on which offenses may be considered political
offenses applies only to those warrants issued after the commence-
ment of the 1987 Act, even though the offense for which extradition
is sought may have been committed prior to the passing of the
Act. 160
In the case of Dermot Finucane, the IRA terrorist who escaped
from the Maze Prison,' 6 ' the Irish Supreme Court refused the Brit-
ish request for his extradition, holding that the offenses for which his
153. Anglo-Irish Summit Meeting Joint Communique, Nov. 15, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1579,
1581.
154. Extradition (Suppression of Terrorism) Act, No. I (Jr. 1987).
155. Id. § 12(3).
156. See id. §§ 3, 4.
157. Extradition Act, No. 17, § 3 (Jr. 1965).
158. Extradition (Suppression of Terrorism) Act, No. I, § 3(I)(a), (2)(b), (Jr. 1987).
159. Suppression of Terrorism Act, 1978, ch. 26., § I.
160. Extradition (Suppression of Terrorism) Act, No. 1, § 3(2)(b), (Jr. 1987).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 73 & 74.
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extradition was requested were political offenses.' 62 Though the Su-
preme Court did not decide Finucane's fate until March 13, 1990,
over two years after the enactment of the 1987 Act, the warrants for
his arrest were issued in Northern Ireland on October 5, 1987, two
months prior to the enactment of the 1987 Act. 6 Because the 1987
Act does not allow for retroactive application, Finucane was permit-
ted to avail himself of the protection of the political offense excep-
tion embodied in the Extradition Act, and Finucane, a convicted
IRA terrorist, was permitted to walk away scot-free. 64 The Court's
refusal to extradite Finucane, compelled by the Irish Suppression of
Terrorism Act, infuriated British officials and highlighted a serious
flaw in the Act.16 5
Owen Carron, arrested for firearms offenses in Northern Ire-
land, skipped bail in Northern Ireland and fled to the south.' 6 On
April 6, 1990, the Irish Supreme Court held that the offenses for
which Carron's extradition was requested were connected to a politi-
cal offense, denied his extradition, an thus freed another fugitive ac-
cused of terrorist activity." 7 As a result of the Court's refusal to
extradite Carron, and three weeks after its refusal to extradite Finu-
cane and a compatriot, Anglo-Irish relations "plumbed new
depths."' 68 These refusals to extradite took on new meaning when,
three days after the Carron decision, four British soldiers were killed
near Downpatrick, Northern Ireland. 6 9
Section three of the 1987 Act sets out those offenses which may
not be considered political for the purposes of Part III of the Extra-
dition Act.'7  Among those offenses which are not to be regarded as
political offenses under section three are: offenses within the scope of
the Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Air-
craft' 7' and for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Civilian Aviation;17 serious offenses against internationally pro-
162. Finucane v. McMahon, 1990 I.L.R.M. 505 (LEXIS, Irelnd library, cases file, at
18); see supra text accompanying notes 75-85.
163. Finucane v. McMahon, 1990 I.L.R.M. 505 (LEXIS, Irelnd library, cases file, at 7).
164. Id. (LEXIS, Irlnd library, cases file, at 18).
165. N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1990, at A3, col. 5.
166. Carron v. McMahon, 1989 Nos. 139 and 146 (Transcript), 6 April 1990 (LEXIS,
Irelnd library, cases file, at 1); see supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
167. Carron, (LEXIS, Irelnd library, cases file, at I); see supra text accompanying notes
108-10.
168. The Times (London), Apr. 7, 1990, at 1, col. I. Peter Brooke, Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland stated that the refusal to extradite Carron was "a matter of gravest
concern" that had "damaging implications all around." Id. Mrs. Thatcher, more to the point,
said, "[vliolent crime is not political. It is common criminal." Ireland: Bad Old Law, ECONO-
MIST, Apr. 14, 1990, at 64, col. 1.
169. N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1990, at A3, col. I.
170. Extradition (Suppression of Terrorism) Act, No. 1, § 3 (Ir. 1987).
171. Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for
signature 16 December 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192.
172. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Avia-
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tected persons; kidnapping or serious false imprisonment; and of-
fenses involving the use of an explosive or an automatic firearm, if
such use endangers persons. 173 Murder, manslaughter, and assault
are not included in this section. While "false imprisonment" is not to
be considered a political offense under the British Suppression of
Terrorism Act,174 only "serious" false imprisonment may be ex-
cluded from the political offense exception under the 1987 Act. 17 5
The British Suppression of Terrorism Act does not regard as a politi-
cal offense any act, including conspiracy and possession, which in-
volves explosives, with the intent to endanger life, or the use of a
firearm or the possession of a firearm with intent to injure. 17  The
1987 Act covers only those offenses involving the use of an explosive
or an automatic firearm, if such use endangers persons.1 77
In June, 1990, two Northern Ireland police officers were shot
and killed by the IRA while patrolling a crowded Belfast street.178
Under section three, offenses involving automatic weapons shall not
be regarded as political, yet offenses involving semi-automatic or sin-
gle-shot weapons apparently may be considered political offenses. If
the IRA terrorist who committed these crimes had used a semi-auto-
matic or single-shot weapon and was found in the Republic, she con-
ceivably could escape extradition under section three by being per-
mitted to avail herself of the political offense exception. Likewise,
possession of explosives is not excluded from consideration as a polit-
ical offense under this section. 79 In the summer of 1990, both the
Carlton Club in London180 and the London Stock Exchange18 ' were
devastated by IRA bombs. Had any of the terrorists involved in
these bombings, or those who killed Ian Gow, 82 been apprehended
in the United Kingdom before they had the opportunity to plant
their bombs there, but subsequently escaped to the Republic, it is
questionable whether they would be extradited to the United King-
dom, as possession of explosives may be considered a political offense
under section three of the 1987 Act. Because the IRA relies so heav-
ily on the use of firearms and explosives'8" in its terrorist campaign
tion, opened for signature 23 September 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570.
173. Extradition (Suppression of Terrorism) Act, No. I § 3(3)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
(Ir. 1987).
174. Suppression of Terrorism Act, 1978, ch. 26, sched. 1, para. 5.
175. Extradition (Suppression of Terrorism) Act, No. I § 3(3)(a)(iv) (Ir. 1987).
176. Suppression of Terrorism Act, 1978, ch. 26, sched. 1, paras. 13(a), (b), 14.
177. Extradition (Suppression of Terrorism) Act, No. I, § 3(3)(a)(v) (Ir. 1987).
178. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1990, at A5, col. 17.
179. Extradition (Suppression of Terrorism) Act, No. 1, § 3(a)(v) (Ir. 1987).
180. N.Y. Times, July 21, 1990, at A3, col. I.
181. Id.
182. The Times (London), July 31, 1990, at I, col. 1.
183. Finucane v. McMahon, 1990 I.L.R.M. 505 (LEXIS, Irelnd library, cases file, at
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against the British, the 1987 Act should have broadened instead of
limited the scope of those offenses involving firearms and explosives
which may not be considered political in nature, in order to ensure
that the political offense "loophole" could not be further manipu-
lated by IRA terrorists.
The 1987 Act is not as weak as it appears on preliminary exam-
ination. Section three, as discussed above, sets out those offenses
which are not to be considered prima facie political offenses. Section
four sets out certain other offenses which may not be regarded as
political in certain circumstances. Section four applies to "any seri-
ous offense . . .(i) involving an act of violence against the life, phys-
ical integrity, or liberty of a person, or (ii) involving an act against
property if the act created a collective danger for persons."',8 In de-
termining Whether certain of these serious offenses should be consid-
ered political offenses or offenses connected with political offenses,
the court or the Minister of Justice must first take into consideration
certain aspects of the offense, including: whether it created a collec-
tive danger to the life, physical integrity or liberty of persons;
whether it affected persons foreign to the motives behind it; whether
cruel or vicious means were used in the commission of the offense. 85
The Supreme Court of Ireland in Finucane v. McMahon"" pointed
out how this consideration to be made under section four can
strengthen the application of the 1987 Act as against terrorists:
The reference to "collective," "persons foreign to the motives,"
and "cruel and vicious means" are recognised elements of ter-
rorism. The court is empowered to form the opinion by reason of
these elements that the offence could not properly be regarded
as a political offence or an offence connected with a political
offence.' 8 7
After this consideration under section four, if either the court of
the Minister is of the opinion that the offense cannot properly be
regarded as a political offense, then it will not be so considered. 88
Murder, manslaughter, possession of firearms, and simple false im-
prisonment, which are not specifically excluded under section three,
may all be excluded from consideration as political offenses under
section four if, in light of the unique circumstances of the particular
offense, the court or Minister makes the appropriate determination.
Had the 1987 Act been applicable to Owen Carron, the offense with
which he was accused - possession of firearms - would not have
184. Extradition (Suppression of Terrorism) Act, No. 1, § 4(2)(a)(i)(I),(1l) (Ir. 1987).
185. Id. § 4(2)(a)(i)-(iii).
186. Finucane v. McMahon, 1990 I.L.R.M. 505 (LEXIS, Irelnd library, cases file).
187. Id. (LEXIS, IrInd library, cases file, at 13).
188. Extradition (Suppression of Terrorism) Act, No. 1, § 4(l)(a) (Ir. 1987).
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been covered under section three as an offense which is prima facie
nonpolitical. Yet he may have been found extraditable for his offense
under section four.
While abating the applicability of the political offense excep-
tion, the 1987 Act does not leave the politically oppressed helpless. 189
The 1987 Act amends section 44 of the Extradition Act which speci-
fies circumstances in which a warrant shall not be endorsed, and sec-
tion 50 which specifies circumstances in which a person arrested
shall be released.19 The Minister or the High Court may now refuse
to endorse a warrant191 or may release the arrestee if "there are sub-
stantial grounds for believing that the warrant was in fact issued for
the purpose of prosecuting or punishing . . . [the fugitive offender]
on account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinion or
that his position would be prejudiced for any of these reasons. '
In 1987, the Oireachtas also passed an amendment to Part III
of the Extradition Act of 1965 called the Extradition (Amendment)
Act [the Amendment Act]. 193 Section 44 of the Extradition Act pro-
vides that the Commissioner of the Garda Siochdna shall not endorse
a warrant if the Minister or High Court is of the opinion that the
warrant relates to a political offense or that the person sought will be
prosecuted for a political offense if returned to the United King-
dom.1 94 The Amendment Act amends section 44 by adding section
44A which provides that "[a] warrant . . . shall not be endorsed for
execution . . . if the Attorney General so directs."' 95 The Amend-
ment Act also adds section 44B to the Extradition Act which pro-
vides that the Attorney General shall order that a warrant not be
endorsed, unless, after considering all appropriate information, he is
of the opinion that there is a clear intention, founded on the exis-
tence of sufficient evidence, to prosecute the person sought for the
offense specified in the warrant. 98 This provision seems aimed at two
scenarios: the prosecution of the person sought once return to the
United Kingdom for crimes other than those set out in the warrant;
and, the interrogation, as opposed to prosecution, of the person
sought once returned. The determinations to be made by the Attor-
ney General under section 44B are determinations which are essen-
tially political in nature, and properly to be made by the Executive
189. Id. §§ 8,9.
190. Id.
191. Id. § 8 (amending § 44 of the Extradition Act, No. 17 (Ir. 1965)).
192. Extradition (Suppression of Terrorism) Act, No. 1, § 9 (Ir. 1987) (amending § 50
of the Extradition Act, No. 17 (lr. 1965)).
193. Extradition (Amendment) Act, No. 25 (Ir. 1987).
194. Extradition Act, No. 17, § 44 (Ir. 1965).
195. Extradition (Amendment) Act, No. 25, § 2(I)(a) (Ir. 1987).
196. Id.
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Branch of the government. 197 Yet allowing political considerations to
play such a determinative role in which is essentially a legal proceed-
ing sometimes wreaks havoc.
Father Patrick Ryan, an Irish priest, was wanted in the United
Kingdom for terrorist offenses.1" 8 Ryan was found in Belgium from
where the British tried unsuccessfully to extradite him. 199 The Belgi-
ans released Ryan and sent him to Ireland 00 The British then sub-
mitted four warrants issued in London for Ryan's arrest to the Com-
missioner of the Garda Siochna for endorsement. 01 Pursuant to the
Amendment Act, the Irish Attorney General, John Murray, took the
endorsement request under advisement.02 In respect to the charges
in two of the warrants, Murray, after considering all appropriate in-
formation, concluded that there was a clear intention on the part of
the British government to prosecute Ryan for the offenses
charged. 0 Yet Murray reached no conclusion on the other two war-
rants because, as he claimed in a statement issued by his office,
the effect of the material [concerning Fr. Ryan] published [and
televised in the United Kingdom] has, manifestly and inescap-
ably, been to create such prejudice and hostility to Patrick Ryan
that, were he to be extradited to Britain, it would not be possible
for a jury to approach the issue of his guilt or innocence free
from bias . . . No direction to the jury by the trial judge to
ignore the prejudicial matter to which they have been exposed
could be effective in removing the bias which has been
created. 04
Murray therefore directed the Commissioner of the Garda Siochdna
not to endorse the warrants °.20  The British were outraged.20 6 And
197. See infra text accompanying notes 274 & 275.
198. The Legacy of Father Ryan, ECONOMIST, Dec. 10, 1988, at 59.
199. The Times (London), Dec. 14, 1988, at 6, col. I.
200. Id.
201. Id.; see Extradition Ace, No. 17, § 43 (Ir. 1965).
202. The Times (London), Dec. 14, 1988, at 6, col. 1; see Extradition (Amendment)
Act, No. 25, § 2(a) (Ir. 1987).
203. The Times (London), Dec. 14, 1988, at 6, col. 3.
204. Id. at 6, col. 6.
British television news reports showed the scenes of the aftermath of a num-
ber of explosions which had occurred in Britain previously and linked them to
the charges on . . . [Ryan's] warrants . . . [Rieferences to Patrick Ryan ...
have appeared in newspapers ... and on radio and television, over a protracted
period. They consisted, inter alia, of attacks on Patrick Ryan's general charac-
ter, often expressed in intemperate language ... and also assertions of his guilt
of the offences comprised in the warrants .... An equally serious matter is the
making of certain statements in the House of Commons. The tone, tenor and
contents of much of what was said carried an assumption or inference of guilt on
the part of [Father Ryan] . .. [T]he statements in the House of Commons
must, because of their origin, carry particular weight with potential jurors.
Id. at 6, cols. 3-6.
205. Id. at 6, col. 6.
206. Patrick Ryan: No Go, ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 1988, at 63. Not all thought the Brit-
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rightly so. Under section 44B of the Amendment Act, the Attorney
General is merely to decide whether there is a clear intention on the
part of the United Kingdom to prosecute the person sought for the
offenses claimed.20 7 While the 1987 Act requires the Minister or the
High Court to make an inquiry into whether the person sought
would be prejudiced, if returned, on account of his race, religion,
nationality or political opinions, 08 neither the Extradition Act, nor
the 1987 Act, nor the Amendment Act requires any inquiry into the
fairness of any resulting jury trial in the United Kingdom. The Irish
Supreme Court has held that it is for the judiciary to "safeguard the
constitutional rights of the fugitive and [to] ensure that there will be
no rendition which would subject the fugitive to injustice or to any
treatment or procedure which would be inconsistent with the norms
of our concept of fair procedures. 20 9
Both the British Suppression of Terrorism Act and the 1987
Act have abated the applicability of the political offense exception in
extradition proceedings.21 0 This has been the most important step in
amendment extradition laws in such a way as to deny to terrorists
the protection historically due only to those who have used violence
legitimately in the course of liberating themselves from political op-
pression. The fact that the 1987 Act does not provide for retroactive
application will continue to be a problem only insofar as there are
outstanding arrest warrants, issued before the December 6, 1987 en-
actment of the Act. " ' Should the killers of Ian Gow, of the three
soldiers and Sister Catherine Dunn in Armagh, and of the four
soldiers in Downpatrick flee to Ireland, there should be no problem
applying the 1987 Act, and they will not be permitted to avail them-
selves of the protection of political offense exception. So long as they
are not granted bail, and the Irish Attorney General does not make
determinations he is not empowered to make, these killers will be
brought to justice.
ish blameless in this matter:
Too often, British newspaper (widely read in Ireland) and television (widely
watched there) have discussed the Ryan case as if the Irish could not speak
English. And anyone who thinks that the House of Commons has discussed the
Ryan case with the fastidious care that should apply to legal proceedings has not
been to Westminster in the past two weeks. Baying for blood belongs on the
foxhunt; it has no place in such delicate negotiations.
Id.
207. Extradition (Amendment) Act, No. 25, § 2(a) (Ir. 1987).
208. Extradition (Suppression of Terrorism) Act, No. 1, §§ 8, 9 (Ir. 1987).
209. Finucane v. McMahon, 1990 I.L.R.M. 505 (LEXIS, Irelnd library, cases file, at
17).
210. Suppression of Terrorism Act, 1978, ch. 26, § 1; Extradition (Suppression of Ter-
rorism) Act, No. I, §§ 3, 4 (fr. 1987).
211. See Extradition (Suppression of Terrorism) Act, No. I, § 3(2)(b) (ir. 1987).
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B. The United States and the United Kingdom
1. The 1972 United States-United Kingdom Extradition
Treaty.-Extradition between the United Kingdom and the United
States is conducted pursuant to the 1972 Extradition Treaty between
the governments of the two states.2 12 The Treaty requires that three
basic criteria be met before extradition shall be granted for acts
which constitute an offense to which the Treaty applies."' The of-
fense must first be punishable under the laws of both the United
Kingdom and the Unites States by not less than one year imprison-
ment or by death.214 This "dual criminality" requirements is satisfied
if the essential character of the acts is made criminal in both
states.2 15 Exact correspondence between the definitions of a crime in
each state is not required. 1
The second requirement is that the offense be extraditable
under the law of the United Kingdom.21 7 This requirement has been
determined by British courts to be satisfied if the act which the ac-
cused has committed would have amounted to the commission of a
crime under the law of the United Kingdom if it had been commit-
ted in the United Kingdom.21 8 The final requirement is that the of-
fense constitute a felony under the law of the United States.2 1 9
The United Kingdom must provide a statement of the legal pro-
visions which establish that the offense for which extradition is re-
quested is an extraditable offense under British law when the United
212. 1972 Extradition Treaty, supra note 21.
213. Id. art. 111(1).
214. Id. art. III(l)(a).
215. R v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex parte Budlong, [1980] I All E.R. 701, 711
(Q.B.) (quoting Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1902)); see also Oen Yin-Choy v. Robinson,
858 F.2d 1400, 1404 (9th Cir. 1988) ("To satisfy dual criminality, the name by which the
crime is described in the two countries need not be the same, nor does the scope of liability for
the crime need to be the same.").
216. Ex Parte Budlong [19801 I All E.R. at 709. The extradition of the petitioners was
sought by the United States for charges of burglary. Under the relevant American law entry
as a trespasser is not an essential element of burglary, whereas trespass is an essential element
of the crime under English law. Id. at 708. The 1972 Treaty requires the offense for which
extradition is sought be extraditable under the laws of the United Kingdom. 1972 Extradition
Treaty, supra note 21, article III(l)(b). For an offense to be extraditable under the laws of the
United Kingdom it must be an "extradition crime" as defined in the Extradition Act of 1870.
Ex parte Budlong, [19801 1 All E.R. at 712 (citing Extradition Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch.
52). An "extradition crime" is defined by the Extradition Act of 1870 as "a crime which, if
committed in England or within English jurisdiction, would be one of the crimes described in
the first schedule to this Act." Id. (citing Extradition Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 52, § 26).
The court interpreted this definition to mean that an "extradition crime" has been committed
if that which the accused has done would have amounted to the commission of one of the
crimes listed in the schedule had it been done in the U.K. Id. The actions of the accused, if
committed in the U.K., would have constituted the crime of burglary under English law, so the
requirement of dual criminality was met.
217. 1972 Extradition Treaty, supra note 21, art. III(l)(b).
218. R v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex parte Budlong, [19801 I All E.R. 701, 712
(Q.B.); see supra note 216 and accompanying text.
219. 1972 Extradition Treaty, supra note 21, art. III(l)(c).
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Kingdom is requesting extradition.220 When the United States is the
requesting state, it must provide a statement that the offense consti-
tutes a felony under American law.221 Requests must be made
through the diplomatic channel.2"2 In addition to the statements es-
tablishing the offense as extraditable under British law or as a felony
under American law, the request for extradition must also be accom-
panied by a description of the person sought; a statement of the facts
of the offense charged; and the text, of any, of the law defining the
offense, prescribing the maximum penalty, and imposing any statute
of limitations.223 If the request relates to an accused person, the re-
quest must also be accompanied by an arrest warrant issued by a
judge in the requesting state.224 This warrant is not endorsed, as it
would be under the Backing of Warrants Act and the Extradition
Act,225 but is considered only as evidence upon which the extradition
decision is made.226 If the extradition of a convicted person is re-
quested, the requesting state must provide a certificate or judgment
of conviction.227
In the United Kingdom, the materials accompanying the re-
quest are first considered by the legal advisers in the Home Office,
who then advise the Secretary of State whether to refer the request,
by order, to a magistrate. 228 Upon his preliminary consideration and
at his discretion, the Secretary of State may refuse to send an order
to a magistrate and discharge the fugitive offender from custody. 2 9
At this time, he may consider whether the offense charged is of a
political character and thus non-extraditable.230 When the magis-
trate receives an order, it is his duty to examine the evidence before
issuing an arrest warrant.231
The system in the United States is different. The initial request
for the arrest of the person sought is made to a federal justice, judge,
or authorized magistrate. 23 2 When the fugitive is apprehended, he is
brought before the issuing justice, judge, or magistrate, who must
then conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence is suffi-
cient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the relevant extra-
220. Id. art. VlI(2)(d)(i).
221. Id. art. VII(2)(d)(ii).
222. Id. art. VII(l).
223. 1972 Extradition Treaty, supra note 21, at VII(2).
224. Id. art. VII(3).
225. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § 1; Extradition Act,
No. 17, § 43 (Ir. 1965).
226. 1972 Extradition Treaty, supra note 21, art. VII(5).
227. Id. art. VII(4).





232. 18 U.S.C. 3184 (1948).
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dition treaty. 33 If the justice, judge, or magistrate finds the evidence
sufficient, she must certify her finding to the Secretary of State so
that arrangements for the fugitive's surrender may be made with the
proper foreign authorities.234 The fugitive offender is then remanded
in custody, not on bail, until he is surrendered. 3 5 Under the Ameri-
can system, the magistrate must certify to the Secretary of State
that the fugitive is extraditable if the evidence supports this determi-
nation.2 36 The ultimate decision to surrender the person, however,
rests with the Secretary of State.237 The court's legal determination
that a person is extraditable does not bind or control the Secretary of
State's subsequent political determination. 238
The Treaty provides several situations in which extradition shall
not be granted. Procedurally, extradition shall not be granted if the
person sought would be entitled to a discharge on the grounds of a
previous acquittal or conviction in the'requesting or requested state,
or in a third state. 239 A court shall also refuse to extradite a person if
the prosecution of the offense charged would be barred by "lapse of
time" under the law of either the requesting or requested stated.240
In In re McMullen"4 respondent McMullen, an Irish citizen and
former member of the PIRA, was wanted in the United Kingdom in
connection with several bombings that took place in March, 1974 in
North Yorkshire County, England.242 A warrant was issued in the
United Kingdom for his arrest in June, 1978, but McMullen had fled
to the United States.243 A request for his extradition from the
United States was filed by the United States Government on behalf
of the United Kingdom, pursuant to article XIV of the 1972 Treaty,
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.; see Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 786 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986). Because of the
limited function of an extradition hearing, there may be no appeal from an extradition order
by either the government or the fugitive offender. Instead, the Government may reinstate an
extradition request with another magistrate, and the fugitive offender may seek review by fil-
ing a petition for habeas corpus. Contra Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965,
ch. 45, § 3(1) and Extradition Act, No. 17, § 48(l)(2) (Ir. 1965) which require the person
sought not be surrendered for fifteen days in order that he may appeal the.order for delivery
made by the magistrate below.
236. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1948); see In re United States, 713 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1983)
("The court determines whether the fugitive is subject to extradition and, if so, must order the
fugitive's commitment and certify the record to the Secretary of State. Id. at 108.).
237. 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1948); see In Re United States, 713 F.2d at 108.
238. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 516 (7th Cir. 1981) (citing In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972
(N.D. Cal. 1894)).
239. 1972 Extradition Treaty, supra note 21, art. V(l)(a).
240. Id. art. V(I)(b).
241. In re the Requested Extradition of McMullen by the Government of the United
Kingdom, No. 86 CR. MISC. I (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 1988) (WESTLAW, Allfeds library)
[hereinafter McMullen 11].
242. Id. at I.
243. Id.
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in July 1978.24 McMullen's extradition was denied in 1979 on the
grounds that the offense he allegedly committed was political in na-
ture, and thus non-extraditable under the 1972 Treaty.2 45 The
United States then successfully sought McMullen's deportation.4 6
In December, 1986, as McMullen was in the process of being de-
ported, he was arrested in New York pursuant to a provisional war-
rant issued under the Supplementary Treaty and McMullen found
himself fighting extradition once again, over twelve years since the
bombings in which he was allegedly involved.2" McMullen moved
for a dismissal on the grounds that his extradition was barred by the
statute of limitations, because under Federal law, an indictment
must be found or an information instituted within five years after a
non-capital offense has been committed.2 48 The Government argued
that his extradition was not barred because under section 3290 of
Title 18 of the United States Code, statutes of limitations shall not
apply to any person fleeing from justice.24 9 McMullen countered by
arguing he had been living openly, and had been available for. fur-
ther extradition proceedings, in the United States since his extradi-
tion was denied in 1979, and had not been fleeing justice.2 50 The
court held, however, that McMullen's failure to surrender to British
officials, by whom McMullen knew he was wanted, constituted "con-
structive flight from justice," and that the statute of limitations had
not tolled.2 51 Therefore, the prosecution of McMullen would not be
barred by "lapse of time," and the "lapse of time" defense could not
be used to stop his extradition.
Extradition may be barred under the 1972 Treaty on more sub-
stantive grounds as well. If the offense charged is regarded by the
requested party as one of a political character, the fugitive shall not
be extradited. 52 In the United Kingdom this determination may be
made preliminary by the Secretary of State, or by the courts on re-
view of habeas corpus petitions. 53 In the United States, the execu-
tive has claimed that the term "requested party" refers to the Secre-
tary of State, not the judiciary, and that the Secretary should
244. Id.
245. McMullen 11, supra note 241, at 1.
246. Id.
247. Id.; for a discussion of the Supplemental Treaty see infra note 279.
248. McMullen 1i, supra note 241, at 2; see also id. at n.3, quoting 18 U.S.C. 3282
(1948) ("Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried,
or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information
instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been committed.").
249. McMullen II, supra note 241, at 3.
250. Id. at 4.
251. Id.
252. 1972 Extradition Treaty, supra note 21, art. V(l)(c)(i).
253. R. -v. Governor of Pentonville Prison ex parte Budlong [1980] 1 All E.R. 701, 705
(Q.B.) (citing Extradition Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 52, § 7).
Spring 1991 ]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
determine whether the fugitive may avail herself of the political of-
fense exception.26' American courts have rejected the executive's po-
sition and have held the determination of whether an offense is of a
political character is in the realm of the judiciary.255 The position of
the American judiciary on this position was staunchly defended by
the court in In re Doherty. 5 6 Joseph Doherty was a member of the
IRA who, along with three other IRA terrorists, attacked a convoy
of British soldiers in Belfast in May, 1980.257 A British Army Cap-
tain was killed in the ambush.2 58 Doherty was arrested and charged
with murder, attempted murder, and illegal possession of firearms
among other offenses. 59 While being held in prison pending trial,
Doherty escaped and fled to the United States.2"' Doherty was sub-
sequently convicted in absentia and the United Kingdom requested
his extradition under the 1972 Treaty. 61 The court to which the ex-
tradition request was made determined that the offenses with which
Doherty was charged were political offenses and denied the United
Kingdom's extradition request.2 62 In doing so the court stated,
the Court is not persuaded by the fact that the current political
administration in the United States as strongly denounced ter-
rorist acts and has stated that to refuse extradition in this case
might jeopardize foreign relations . . . The [1972] Treaty vests
the determination of the limits of the political offense exceptionin the courts and therefore reflects a congressional judgment
that that decision not be made on the basis of what may be the
current view of any one political administration.2 63
In determining whether the political offense exception applies,
American courts have generally considered whether there was a vio-
lent political disturbance or uprising in the requesting country at the
time of the alleged acts, and whether the acts charged against the
fugitive were recognizably incidental to the disturbance or upris-
ing.2"' This test has not been applied blindly, however. Courts have
254. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 517 (7th Cir. 1981); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d
776, 787 (9th Cir. 1986).
255. Eain, 641 F.2d at 513; see also Quinn, 783 F.2d at 788 ("[W]e ... recognize the
individual liberty concerns at stake in cases of this nature.and note the Supreme Court's long
accepted conclusion that 'extradition without an unbiased hearing before an independent judi-
ciary . . . [is] highly dangerous to liberty, and ought never to be allowed in this country.'"
(quoting In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 112, 14 L.Ed. 345 (1852))).
256. In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
257. Id. at 272:
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 277.
263. Id. at 277, n.6.
264. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 515-16 (7th Cir. 1981); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d
776, 806 (9th Cir. 1986).
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recognized that the crimes perpetrated by international terrorist or-
ganizations are not deserving of the concern and sympathy "for the
cause of liberation for subjugated peoples" which originally gave rise
to the political offense exception.285 Not every offense committed for
a political purpose or during a political uprising "may or should
properly be regarded by the courts as a political offense." 2 6 Today,
courts consider the nature of each act, the context in which it was
committed, the status of the actors and victims, the particularized
circumstances of the situs, as well as policy considerations.267 Yet,
despite the standards and tests promulgated by courts in an attempt
to extradite terrorists while still protecting those activities originally
intended to be protected, terrorists still escaped extradition by
manipulating the political offense exception.268 As has been the case
between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, extradi-
tion of IRA members from the United States to the United Kingdom
has been severely hampered by the provision for an unqualified polit-
ical offense exception in the 1972 Treaty. 69
The 1972 Treaty provides that courts shall refuse extradition if
the fugitive offender proves the request for her extradition has in
fact been made with a view to try or to punish her for an offense of a
265. In re Doherty; 599 F. Supp. 270, 275, n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Eain, 641 F.2d at 519-
20; Quinn, 783 F.2d at 805-06. Contra Statement made by Senator Jesse Helms voicing con-
cern over the emasculation of the political offense exception:
If this treaty had been in effect in 1776 .. . [its] language would have
labeled the boys who fought at Lexington and Concord as terrorists. There is no
question that the British authorities in 1776 would have considered the guerrilla
operations of the Americans to be murder and assault. Their offenses included
the use of bombs, grenades, rockets, firearms, and incendiary devices, endanger-
ing persons, as may be demonstrated by reference to our National Anthem.
Hannay, An Analysis of the U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 21 INT'L LAW.
925, 930, n.22 (1987) (citing 132 CONG. REC. S9161 (daily ed. July 16, 1986)).
266. Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 274.
Surely the atrocities at Dachau, Aushwitz [sic], and other death camps
would be arguably political within the meaning of that definition. The same
would be true of My Lai, the Bataan death march, Lidice, the Katyn Forest
Massacre, and a whole host of violations of international law that the civilized
world is, had been, and should be unwilling to accept.
Id.
267. Id. at 275; Eain, 641 F.2d at 520.
Terrorists who have committed barbarous acts elsewhere would [if the polit-
ical offense exception were applied blindly] be able to flee to the United States
and live in our neighborhoods and walk our streets forever free from any ac-
countability for their acts. We do not need them in our society. We have enough
of our domestic criminal violence with which to contend without importing and
harboring with open arms the worst that other countries have to export. We
recognize the validity and usefulness of the political offense exception, but it
should be applied with great care lest our country become a social jungle and an
encouragement to terrorists everywhere.
Id.
268. See In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); McMullen v. I.N.S., 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986).
269. See In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); McMullen v. I.N.S., 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986).
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political character.Y7 0 In the United States, the determination of
whether the request for extradition for common crimes amounts to a
subterfuge by the requesting state to punish the fugitive for a politi-
cal offense is within the sole province of the Secretary of State.2 71
American courts view the question of whether an extradition request
amounts to a subterfuge as involving political questions and judg-
ments on the motivation of a foreign government and thus properly
in the purview of the Executive.2 72 Yet British courts do not assume
a foreign state will not observe the terms of a treaty and commit a
subterfuge, and thus interpret this section differently.27 3 As inter-
preted in the United Kingdom, this section "does no more than per-
mit the accused to show by evidence that the offense for which extra-
dition is asked is in truth of a political character, although it might
not appear to be so from the evidence produced by the country re-
questing extradition."2 4 As a result of these different interpreta-
tions, courts in the United Kingdom may consider the motives and
policies of the requesting state if such is submitted into evidence,
while American courts leave policy determinations to the Executive.
If it is determined that none of the exceptions set out in article
III applies, extradition may then be granted only if the evidence is
found to be "sufficient according to the law of the requested Party
either to justify the committal for trial of the person sought if the
offense of which he is accused had been committed in the territory of
the requested Party or to prove that he is the identical person con-
victed by the courts of the requesting Party. '275 The clause "if the
evidence [is] found [to be] sufficient according to the law of the re-
270. 1972 Extradition Treaty, supra note 21, art. V(l)(c)(ii).
271. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, at 513, 518 (7th Cir. 1981).
272. Id. at 516-17.
273. Re Kolczynski [1955] I Q.B. 31. ("The court must not assume that the foreign
state will not observe the terms of the treaty . . . [T]he section cannot, therefore, in my opin-
ion, mean that the court may say that, if extradition is sought for crime 'A' we believe that, if
the .prisoner is surrendered, he will be tried and punished for crime 'B.' " Id. at 35 (per Lord
Goddard.)) The Kolczynski court was not considering the 1972 Treaty, but rather the Extradi-
tion Act of 1870 which provides that
[a] fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered . . . if he prove [sic] to the
satisfaction of the police magistrate or the court before whom he is brought on
habeas corpus . . . that the requisition for his surrender has in fact been made
with a view to try or punish him for an offence of a political character.
Re Kolczynski, [1955] I Q.B. at 34 (citing Extradition Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 52, §
3(l)). Yet this section is remarkably similar to that found in the 1972 Extradition Act, and
the remarks of Lord Goddard are relevant.
274. R. v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex parte Budlong [1980] I All E.R. 701, 715
(Q.B.). See also Re Kolcyznski [1955] I Q.B. at 35 ("if, in proving the facts necessary to
obtain extradition, the evidence adduced in support shows that the offence has a political char-
acter, the application must be refused, but although the evidence in support appears to disclose
merely one of the scheduled offences [and not a political offense], the prisoner may show that,
in fact, the offence is of a political character.") (per Lord Goddard).
275. 1972 Treaty, supra note 21, art. IX(l).
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quested party" ' has been interpreted to mean that the court or
magistrate must be satisfied that probable cause exists with respect
to the offenses charged in the extradition request. 7
2. The 1985 Supplementary Extradition Treaty.-The 1972
Treaty was not working effectively in extraditing IRA members
wanted for terrorist activities.17 8 In order to make the Treaty more
effective, the United States and United Kingdom concluded a Sup-
plementary Treaty. 9 The Supplementary Treaty did not replace the
1972 Treaty, but rather augmented it, and both treaties are cur-
rently in force. 8
The most important provision of the Supplementary Treaty is
article one, which significantly restricts the offenses which may be
regarded as political in character. As originally drafted, article 1
contained twelve subsections identifying those offenses which were
not to be regarded as political.281 Article one as amended by the
276. Id.
277. In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Quinn v. Robinson, 783
F.2d 776, 783 (9th Cir. 1986). Cf. Ex parte Budlong [1980] 1 All E.R. at 706 ("It is to the
evidence that the magistrate is directed to look to see whether there are sufficient facts estab-
lished to constitute an offence contrary to English law and not to any formal document.")
(emphasis added).
278. See In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270(S.D.N.Y. 1984); McMullen v. I.N.S., 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986).
279. Supplementary Treaty Concerning the Extradition Treaty Between the Govern-
ment of the United States of American and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland signed at London on 8 June 1972, June 25, 1985, - U.S.T.
-, 24 I.L.M. 1105 [hereinafter Supplementary Treaty]. ("The Government of the United
States of American and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland[, d]esiring to make more effective the [1972] Extradition Treaty ... [h]ave re-
solved to conclude . ..[this] Supplementary Treaty." Id. Preamble.).
280. Id. arts. I ("For the purposes of the [1972] Extradition Treaty"), and 6 ("This
Supplementary Treaty shall form an integral part of the [1972] Extradition Treaty").
281. Original Draft of the Supplementary Treaty, supra note 279, reprinted in United
States Extradition Treaties, at 920.18 [hereinafter Original Draft].
For the purposes of the [1972 Extradition Treaty, none of the following
offenses shall be regarded as an offense of a political character: (a) an offense
within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft, [opened for signature 16 December 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S.
No. 71921 .. .; (b) an offense within the scope of the Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, [opened for sig-
nature 23 September 1972, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570] ...; (c) an of-
fense within the scope of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents,
[opened for signature 14 December 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532]
; (d) an offense within the scope of the International Convention against the
Taking of Hostages, [opened for signature 18 December 1979, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/34/146] ..; (e) murder; (f) manslaughter; (g) maliciously wounding or
inflicting grievous bodily harm; (h) kidnapping, abduction, false imprisonment or
unlawful detention, including the taking of a hostage; (i) the following offenses
relating to explosives: (1) the causing of an explosion likely to endanger life or
cause serious damage to property; or (2) conspiracy to cause such an explosion;
or (3) the making of [sic] possession of an explosive substance by a person who
intends either himself or through another person to endanger life or cause seri-
ous damage to property; U) the following offenses relating to firearms or ammu-
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United States Senate and finally adopted by both States, has been
narrowed to contain five subsections.
The first group of offenses exempted from consideration as polit-
ical offenses are 'those for which both states have obligations pursu-
ant to certain multilateral agreements."' 2 The second subpart covers
murder, voluntary manslaughter, and assault "causing grievous bod-
ily harm."2 83 The original draft of the Supplementary Treaty, as
well as the British Suppression of Terrorism Act, excludes "man-
slaughter" from consideration as a political offense. 84 The term
manslaughter was qualified by the term "voluntary" in the Supple-
mentary Treaty in order to "cover crimes which have been held by
the U.K. courts to be manslaughter and which in many U.S. states
would amount to second degree murder."2 85
The third subpart covers kidnapping, abduction, or "serious"
unlawful detention. 86 The Irish Suppression of Terrorism Act (1987
Act) similarly qualifies unlawful detention which shall not be consid-
ered a political offense as "serious" unlawful detention, 287 in contrast
to the British Suppression of Terrorism Act which covers "false im-
prisonment." '288 Yet under the 1987 Act, a particular case of unlaw-
ful detention may still be excluded from the political offense excep-
tion if it is determined by the court to be an act of violence against
the liberty of a person, as set out in section four. 89 The Supplemen-
tary Treaty does not permit any secondary considerations such as
those provided for under section four of the 1987 Act. It is illogical
in the fight against international terrorism to prohibit "serious" un-
lawful detention from being considered a political offense, while al-
lowing simple unlawful detention to be considered as such, especially
nition: (1) the possession of a firearm or ammunition by a person who intends
either himself or through another person to endanger life; or (2) the use of a
firearm by a person with intent to resist or prevent the arrest or detention of
himself or another person; (k) damaging property with intent to endanger life or
with reckless disregard as to whether the life of another would thereby be endan-
gered; (1) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses.
Original Draft, art. 1. Compare Suppression of Terrorism Act, 1978, ch. 26, sched. 1.
282. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 279, art. l(a); see Comments and Recommen-
dations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, reprinted in United States Extradition
Treaties, 920.24 [hereinafter Committee Comments] at 920.27. The Committee stated that
article l(a) shall apply to the four multilateral conventions provided for in article I(a)-(d) in
the original draft of the Supplementary Treaty. See supra note 281. It is unclear as to why, if
this was the intention of the Committee, the wording was changed.
283. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 279, art. l(b).
284. Original Draft, supra note 281, art. I(f); contra Suppression of Terrorism Act,
1978, ch. 26, scheds. I and 2.
285. Committee Comments, supra note 282, at 920.27.
286. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 279, art. I (b); contra Original Draft, supra note
281, art. l(h) (does not qualify unlawful detention as "serious").
287. Extradition (Suppression of Terrorism) Act, No. I, § 3(3)(a)(iv) (Ir. 1987).
288. Suppression of Terrorism Act, 1978, ch. 26, sched. 1, para. 5.
289. Extradition (Suppression of Terrorism) Act, No. I, § 4 (It. 1987); see supra text
accompanying note 184.
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in a treaty the aim of which is to make extradition of terrorists more
effective. Both forms of unlawful detention should be excluded from
consideration as political offenses. At the very least, the Supplemen-
tary Treaty should permit courts to make secondary considerations
such as those provided for in section-four of the 1987 Act.
The fourth subpart refers to offenses involving the use of bombs,
firearms, and other incendiary devices, if this use endangers any per-
son, as well as the attempt to commit any such offenses. 9 The scope
of this clause has been narrowed far too much. The original draft
covered the causing of explosions, conspiracy to cause an explosion,
and possession of an explosive substance intended to endanger life or
damage property. 91 Also covered were the possession of a firearm or
ammunition, and the use of a firearm in resisting arrest. 92 The origi-
nal draft was clearly aimed at those offenses perpetrated most often
by terrorists and would have provided a much stronger base from
which to conduct extradition proceedings than does the Supplemen-
tary Treaty. 93 The Committee offered a weak defense of the nar-
rowed version of this clause by claiming that the use of explosives
would be excluded from the political offense exception "if that use
endangers even one single person. 2 94 Yet if the terrorists who con-
structed the bombs which damaged the London Stock Exchange and
the Carlton Club, and which killed Ian Gow, had been caught before
the bombs could be deployed, no persons would have been endan-
gered. The narrowed version approved by the United States Senate
seems to allow those terrorists the benefit of the political offense ex-
ception. The Committee admitted as much when, in further attempt-
ing to justify its version, it stated that "an individual accused of
helping to construct a bomb, the use of which endangered a person,
would not be able to assert the political offense exception.9 29 5
Owen Carron and his passenger, Maguire, were convicted in
Northern Ireland on weapons possession charges.29 Had both fled to
the United States, it is doubtful they could have been extradited to
the United Kingdom under the Supplementary Treaty, as their of-
fense involved the possession, but not the use, of firearms which did
not endanger any persons because they were caught before they
could use the firearms. 297 The United States Senate should not have
narrowed the scope of article I as originally drafted, especially since
290. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 279, art. I(d), (e).
291. Original Draft, supra note 281, art. I(i)(1)-(3).
292. Id. art. 1U)(l), (2).
293. See supra text accompanying note 183.
294. Committee Comments, supra note 282, at 920.27 (emphasis added)..
295. Id. (emphasis added).
296. Carron v. MeMahon, 1989 Nos. 139 & 146 (Transcript) 6 April 1990 (LEXIS,
Irelnd library, cases file, at 1).
297. Id.
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the IRA uses firearms and explosives devices most often in its cam-
paign against the British in Northern Ireland.""8 The major purpose
of the Supplementary Treaty, that is, the denial to terrorists of the
benefit of the political offense exception, would have been better
served had the original draft been adopted.
The Supplementary Treaty reiterates the requirement of the
1972 Treaty that a court shall grant extradition only where the evi-
dence of criminality is such as, according to the law of the requested
state, would justify committal for trial had the offense been commit-
ted in the territory of the requested state.2 99 Article two of the Sup-
plementary Treaty goes further than the 1972 Treaty, however, by
making it clear that a fugitive offender shall be permitted at her
extradition hearing to present evidence on whether probable cause
exists for believing she committed the offense charged or that she
has been convicted of the offense.3"' The fugitive may also present
evidence on whether a defense to extradition is available, and
whether the act for which her extradition is requested would consti-
tute a punishable offense under Federal law.30' The purpose of arti-
cle two is to "insure that no individual is to be extradited without a
fair hearing. It is designed to lay to rest any assumption that extra-
dition under the Supplementary Treaty will be 'automatic' or that
Federal magistrates and judges will not carefully evaluate the evi-
dence presented in support of extradition."302 The committing jus-
tice, judge, or magistrate is to consider only whether this evidence
justifies holding the accused to await trial, not whether the evidence
is sufficient to justify conviction.303 The extradition hearing is not the
occasion for the adjudication of the fugitive's guilt or innocence.3 0'
These provisions seem to reflect a concern among some parties in the
United States that the restriction on the political offense exception
not close off the United States as a refuge to "genuine rebels" and
"freedom fighters." 30 5
Article three of the Supplementary Treaty also includes provi-
sions aimed at protecting against subterfuge, yet denying aid to
those who commit "terrorist acts of violence," almost identical in
form to such provisions found in the British and Irish Suppression of
298. Finucane v. McMahon, 1990 I.L.R.M. 505 (LEXIS, Irelnd library, cases file, at
11).
299. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 279, art. 2; see 1972 Treaty, supra note 21, art.
IX(l).
300. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 279, art. 2(l)-(3).
301. Id.
302. Committee Comments, supra note 282, at 920.25.
303. McMullen II, supra note 241, at 6.
304. Oen Yin-Choy v. Robinson, 858 F.2d 1400, 1406 (9th Cir. 1988).
305. See supra note 265 and accompanying text (Statement of Senator Jesse Helms).
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Terrorism Acts °.3 8 Article three of the Supplementary Treaty seeks
to protect from extradition dissidents against whom the requesting
state has made "trumped-up" charges with a view to actually pun-
ishing him on account of his race, religion, nationality or political
opinions.30 7 Under paragraph (a) of article three, a fugitive is enti-
tled to present evidence to demonstrate that he will not receive fair
treatment or that he will be prejudiced at trial, on account of his
race, religion, nationality or political opinions if returned to the re-
questing state.30 8 Relief under this part is not so easily obtainable, as
paragraph (a) requires the fugitive offender to prove his claim made
under that paragraph by a preponderance of the evidence:309 This
part also permits findings made under article 3(a) in the United
States to be appealed immediately, by either party." 0 Further, para-
graph (b) limits consideration under paragraph (a) to those offenses
not permitted to be considered political under article one.31 1 This
provision is not, therefore, a general defense to extradition, but
rather a protective device for those who are otherwise extraditable
because their offenses cannot be considered political in character.
The Supplementary Treaty, like the British and Irish Suppres-
sion of Terrorism Acts, seeks to deny to the IRA and other terrorist
groups the protection of the political offense exception. Yet the Sup-
plementary Treaty, as amended by the United States Senate, abates
the applicability of the political offense "loophole" the least of the
three. The political offense exception has been successfully manipu-
lated in the past by the IRA, a fact that leads one to fear that a
political offense "loophole" not closed tightly enough could prevent
306. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 279, art. 3(a).
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Supplementary Treaty,. extradi-
tion shall not occur if the person sought establishes to the satisfaction of the
competent judicial authority by a preponderance of the evidence that the request
for extradition has in face been made with a view to try or punish him on ac-
count of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions, or that he would, if
surrendered, be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his
personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions.
Id. Cf. Suppression of Terrorism Act, 1978, ch. 26, § 2(2), and Extradition (Amendment) Act,
No. 25, § 9 (Ir. 1965) (amends Extradition Act, No. 17, § 50, (Ir. 1965), both of which
contain almost exactly the same language.
307. Committee Comments, supra note 282, at 920.24.
308. See McMullen I1, supra note 241, at 7 (McMullen had submitted numerous dis-
covery requests, three of which sought to discover Britain's position with respect to the rela-
tionship between McMullen and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). The Govern-
ment claimed the information was irrelevant, as the Supplementary Treaty effectively
eliminated the political offense exception. Yet the court held that under article 3(a) McMullen
was entitled to demonstrate that he would not receive fair treatment if returned to the United
Kingdom, and that the requested information would "shed light on the manner of treatment he
could expect to receive upon extradition." Thus, although the respondent's motion to dismiss
on account of the running of a statute of limitations was denied [see supra text accompanying
notes 241-51], the Government was directed to respond to McMullen's discovery requests.).
309. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 279, art. 3(a).
310. Id. art. 3(b); contra see supra note 235 and accompanying text.
311. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 279, art. 3(b).
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the Supplementary Treaty from being used in as effective a manner
as it was originally intended to operate.
C. The United States and the Republic of Ireland
Extradition between the United States and the Republic of Ire-
land is presently carried out pursuant to a 1984 treaty.3"2 The
Treaty deals with extradition in general, and is not specifically
designed to combat international terrorism as are the British and
Irish Suppression of Terrorism Acts, and the Supplementary Treaty
between the United States and the. United Kingdom. 1 ' Those of-
fenses for which a person may be extradited under the United
States-Ireland Treaty are any offenses which are punishable under
the laws of both states by imprisonment of more than one year, or by
a more severe penalty.3 ' Where other treaties have left it to the
courts to determine the issue of "dual criminality," the Treaty be-
tween the United States and Ireland provides that it is irrelevant
whether the laws of the United States and of Ireland denominate the
offense with the same terminology. 315 The Treaty also applies to of-
fenses committed before and after the date the Treaty entered into
force.3"6 The retroactivity of the Treaty is an important provision in
an extradition treaty which may be used to extradite terrorists, as
was shown in the cases of Dermot Finucane317 and Owen Carron.3"8
The application procedure set out in the Treaty is similar to
that set out in the 1972 United States-United Kingdom Treaty.3"9
The request, which must be made in writing through the diplomatic
channel, must contain the following: as accurate a description as pos-
sible of the person sought to assist in establishing his identity and
nationality; the location of the person, if known; a statement of the
pertinent facts of the case; a legal description of the offense, includ-
ing a statement of the maximum penalties.320 Where the person
sought has not yet been convicted in the requesting state, the request
must be accompanied by an arrest warrant, or equivalent order, is-
sued by a competent authority in the requesting state, as well as the
312. The Treaty on Extradition Between the United States of America and Ireland, July
13, 1983, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 10813 [hereinafter United States-Ireland Treaty].
313. Id. Preamble.
314. Id. art. I1(1). Extradition shall also be granted for attempt and conspiracy to com-
mit, aiding, abetting, counseling, procuring, inciting, or otherwise being an accessory to the
commission of an offense referred to in art. 11(l). Id. art. 11(3).
315. Id. art. 11(2)(a).
316. United States-Ireland Treaty, supra note 312, art. XVlI.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 161-65.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 166-69.
319. United States-Ireland Treaty, supra note 312, art. VIII; see 1972 Extradition
Treaty, supra note 21, art. VII.
320. United States-Ireland Treaty, supra note 312, art. VIII(2)(3).
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complaint, information, or indictment.3 2' The warrant is not en-
dorsed, but is evidence.3 12 When the request relates to a convicted
person, the request must be accompanied by the judgment of convic-
tion.32 3 The other treaties discussed above require that the com-
plaint, information, or indictment accompany the request for extra-
dition. This requirement could serve to protect against subterfuge, as
it requires the requesting state to have already instituted proceedings
against the person sought. This is a step which the state may not
want to make if its real purpose in seeking extradition is to try or to
punish the person for some other offense.
Part II of the Extradition Act sets out the general extradition
law of Ireland in relation to countries other than the United King-
dom. 324 Part II is applicable to countries with which Ireland has an
extradition agreement. 32 5 Under Part II, the request for extradition
is received first by the Minister of Justice.326 If, after making some
preliminary considerations, including whether the political offense
exception is applicable, the Minister decides the person sought is ex-
traditable, he is then required to issue an order directing a justice to
issue an arrest warrant. 327 In the United States, a federal justice,
judge, or magistrate is the first to receive an extradition request, and
she issues an arrest warrant at her discretion.3 28 The ultimate deci-
sion to extradite from the United States lies with the Secretary of
State.329 Yet unlike the Irish Minister of Justice, a member of the
executive branch, who makes the ultimate decision as to extradition
from Ireland, the Secretary of State may not consider the political
offense exception in deciding whether to extradite.33 0
Once arrested, the fugitive offender is brought before the issu-
ing magistrate in either the United States or Ireland.331 At this time
a hearing is concluded to determine whether the person should be
extradited. 332 If the court determines the person is extraditable, the
person must be remanded in custody, not on bail, until his delivery to
the proper authorities of the requesting state may be arranged. 333 By
not allowing the fugitive offender to be remanded on bail pending his
321. Id. art. Vlll(4)(a)(b). Either the original or an authenticated copy of the warrant,
or complaint, information, or indictment, is required. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. art. Vlil(5)(a).
324. Extradition Act, No. 17, § 8 (Ir. 1965).
325. Id. 9 8(l).
326. Id. 9 26(l).
327. Id. 9 26(l), § 26(4).
328. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1948).
329. 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1948).
330. See supra text accompanying notes 238-39.
'331. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1948); Extradition Act, No. 17, 99 28, 29 (Ir. 1965).
332. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1948); Extradition Act, No. 17, §§ 28, 29 (Ir. 1965).
333. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1948); Extradition Act, No. 17, § 29 (Ir. 1965).
Spring 1991 ]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
surrender to the requesting state, the Treaty closes off one opportu-
nity available in the Backing of Warrants Act and Part III of the
Extradition Act for terrorists to flee justice again, after being ini-
tially apprehended. 33'
The Extradition Treaty between the United States and Ireland
is the only extradition agreement currently in force between the
United Kingdom, Ireland, and the United States which still recog-
nizes the political offense exception.3 35 Under article IV, the re-
quested state shall not grant extradition when the offense for which
extradition is requested is a political offense. References to political
offenses under the Treaty shall not include the taking or attempted
taking of the life of a Head of State or a member of her family. 33
This qualification has little worth in the fight against the IRA, which
targets civilians, soldiers, and politicians. The political offense excep-
tion would be available to an IRA member who flees to the United
States after committing an armed robbery in Ireland in order to get
money for the IRA, or after killing a member of the British Parlia-
ment visiting Dublin for talks with the Irish government.
Brian Fleming and Charles Malone are members of Fianna
Eireann. 3 7 The group is allegedly the youth wing of the IRA, yet
Fleming claims that the group, whose name means "Soldiers of Ire-
land," promotes moral values.3 38 Fleming and Malone were arrested
in Alabama and have been charged in the United States Federal
Court with conspiracy to export firearms, including M-16 assault
rifles.339 If Fleming and Malone were to escape and flee to Ireland,
the United States would likely have difficulty trying to extradite the
two to the United States under the United States-Ireland Treaty.
Considering that the political offense exception is still available to
fugitive offenders under the Treaty,34 ° and that the Irish Supreme
Court has recognized the possession of firearms 341 and the possession
of firearms with the intent to cause serious injury and endanger
334. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, ch. 45, § 5; Extradition Act,
No. 17, § 46 (Ir. 1965).
335. United States-Ireland Treaty, supra note 312, art. IV(b). Extradition shall also be
refused when the person sought has been convicted or acquitted, or has a prosecution pending
against him, in the requested state, for the offense for which the extradition is requested. In
addition, extradition shall not be granted when the offense for which extradition is requested is
a military offense which is not an offense under the ordinary criminal law of the contracting
parties. Id. art. IV(a), (d).
336. Id. art. IV(b).
337. The Times (London), Apr. 6, 1990, at 6, col. 3-4.
338. Id.; see also Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1978, ch. 5, sched. 2
(lists "Fianna na hEireann" as a proscribed organization).
339. The Times (London), Apr. 6, 1990, at 6, cols. 3-4.
340. United States-Ireland Treaty, supra note 312, art. IV.
341. See Carron v. McMahon, 1989 Nos. 139 & 146 (Transcript), 6 April 1990
(LEXIS, Ireland library, cases file).
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life 42 as political offenses, it seems highly probable that Fleming
and Malone could escape extradition by availing themselves of the
political offense exception. In order to prevent such a scenario, the
Irish government could, pursuant to article 10 of the 1987 Act, di-
rect that the provisions of the 1987 Act, including the limitations on
the political offense exception,343 apply in relation to the United
States.3"4 However, the Irish government has not yet ordered the Act
applicable to the United States. Although the limitation on the polit-
ical offense exception could be applied only in Irish courts when ex-
tradition is sought by the United States, even if just one of the two
countries limits the political offense exception in relation to the
other, this would be a step in the right direction.
The Treaty also protects against subterfuge by the requesting
state. Extradition shall not be granted when there are "substantial
grounds" for believing that the extradition requested for ordinary
criminal offenses has actually been made for the purpose of prosecut-
ing or punishing the person sought on account of his race, religion,
nationality or political opinions.34' 5 Whether this determination is one
for the courts or for the executive has in the past, under different
treaties, been a point of contention between.the two branches in ex-
tradition proceedings. 34' This Treaty sets out, however, that this de-
termination is to be made by the executive authority of each state." 7
The Treaty also provides two discretionary grounds for refusal of
extradition. When the person sought has been convicted in a third
state of the offense for which his extradition is requested, extradition
may be refused. 348 Extradition may also be refused when the "com-
petent authorities" of the requested state have decided to refrain
from prosecuting the person, apparently for any reason. 4 9 The
"competent authorities" to which this Article refers are the Attor-
neys General of the United States and of Ireland. 5 0 Under the laws
of the United States and of Ireland, the Secretary of State and the
Minister of Justice, respectively, may refuse extradition at their dis-
cretion.38 1 It is unclear, then, why these additional grounds for dis-
342. See Finucane v. McMahon, 1990 I.L.R.M. 505 (LEXIS, Irelnd library, cases file).
343. Extradition (Suppression of Terrorism) Act, No. 1, §§ 3, 4 (Ir. 1987).
344. Id. § 10(1) ("The Government may by order direct that all or any of the provisions
of this Act . . . shall apply . . . in relation to any country which is not a convention country
and with which there is in force an extradition agreement.").
345. United States-Ireland Treaty, supra note 312, art. IV(c).
346. See Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981), and Quinn v. Robinson, 783
F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the determination of whether a request for extradition
is in fact a subterfuge is to be made by the executive. Id. at 787).
347. United States-Ireland Treaty, supra note 312, art. lv(c).
348. Id. art. V(a).
349. Id. art. V(b).
350. Id. art. XV(I) ("The Department of Justice of the United States") and (2) ("The
Attorney General of Ireland").
351. 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1948); Extradition Act, No. 17 (1965), § 26(4); see Eain v.
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cretionary refusal of extradition are provided. Perhaps this provision
is merely a recognition that extradition proceedings are not strictly
in the realm of foreign affairs, and thus the heads of domestic law
enforcement are properly given the opportunity to refuse extradition
on grounds relating to domestic policy which may not be in the con-
sideration of the Secretary of State or the Minister of Justice. The
Attorneys General, though, should not be allowed to exercise unbri-
dled discretion in refusing extradition, and should recognize that
some determinations, such as the fairness of the judicial system of
each state, are properly within the purview of the judiciary. 352
The United States-Ireland Treaty makes provision for the exe-
cution of provisional warrants in cases of urgency. 353 Like the Extra-
dition Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom,
the United States-Ireland Treaty requires that a request for a provi-
sional warrant contain a description of the person sought, a state-
ment of the existence in the requesting state of a warrant for arrest
or judgment of conviction, and a statement that the requesting state
intends to send a request for extradition. 54 If the request for extra-
dition is not received within forty-five days of the arrest of the per-
son sought, that person shall be released from custody. 355 The right
of the requested state to institute extradition proceedings after the
expiration of forty-five days shall not be prejudiced if the warrant is
subsequently received. 36
The Extradition Act provides that a member of the Garda Si-
ochdna executing an arrest warrant may seize and retain any prop-
erty which appears to be reasonably required as evidence for proving
the offense charged, and which appears to have been acquired as a
result of the alleged offense. 357 The United States-Ireland Treaty in-
corporates this provision. 3 8 The property seized may be handed over
to the requesting state, yet this delivery of property may be made
conditional upon the property being returned to the requested state
at a later date. 59
Aside from the fact that the political offense exception is still
Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 513 (7th Cir. 1981).
352. See discussion of the Ryan affair, supra text accompanying notes 198-209.
353. United States-Ireland Treaty, supra note 312, art. X; compare Backing of War-
rants Act, 1965, ch. 45, § 4 and Extradition Act, No. 17, § 49 (Ir. 1965) and 1972 Extradition
Treaty, supra note 21, art. VIII (all allowing same procedure).
354. United States-Ireland Treaty, supra note 315, art. X(2).
355. Id. art. X(4); contra Supplementary Treaty, supra note 279, art. 4 (amended art.
VIII(2) of the 1972 Extradition Treaty, supra note 21, which also required release after forty-
five days, to now require release after sixty days.).
356. United States-Ireland Treaty, supra note 312, art. X(4).
357. Extradition Act, No. 17, § 36(1) (Ir. 1965).
358. United States-Ireland Treaty, supra note 312, art. XIV(I).
359. Id. art. XIV(2); compare Extradition Act, No. 17, § 36(3) (Ir. 1965) (allowing
same procedure).
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recognized in the United States-Ireland Treaty, the most significant
impediment to its effective implementation has involved challenges in
Ireland to its validity. Under the Extradition Act, where an interna-
tional extradition agreement is made between Ireland and another
country, Part II of the Act may be applied to that agreement by an
appropriate order of the government. 6 ° Such an order must then be
laid before each House of the Oireachtas, and, if a resolution annul-
ling the order is passed by either House within twenty-one days, the
order shall be annulled. 61 In the case of the Treaty between the
United States and Ireland, the Minister of Foreign Affairs ratified
the Treaty and subsequently submitted an order to Dail Eireann
(House of Representatives) and Seanad Eireann (Senate). 362 Neither
House annulled the Treaty, yet Dail Eireann did not approve it.063
The Government of Ireland proceeded as if the order made the
Treaty enforceable under the law of Ireland. Yet under article 29.5.2
of the Constitution of Ireland, the State shall not be bound by any
international agreement involving a charge upon public funds unless
the terms of the agreement have been approved by Dail Eireann.36 4
Under the Treaty, the Attorney General of Ireland is required to
advise, assist, and represent, or provide for the representation of, the
United States when it is the requesting state. 65 The Treaty further
requires the requesting state to bear all expenses relating to the
transportation of the person sought from the requested state to the
requesting state.3 6 The requested state is required to bear all other
expenses arising out of the request for extradition and the extradi-
tion proceedings. 6
Two fugitives were extradited to the United States under the
terms of the Treaty before its validity was challenged. 8 In Gilliland
the Supreme Court interpreted article 29.5.2 of the Irish Constitu-
tion to require not that Dail Eireann approve the nature and extent
of the charge upon the public fund, but only those terms of the
agreement which involve such a charge.369 The Court found that ar-
ticle XVI of the Treaty, requiring the Attorney General of Ireland to
360. Extradition Act, No. 17, § 8(1) (Ir. 1965).
361. Id. § 4. The Oireachtas is divided into two Houses: the Dail Eireann (House of
Representatives) and the Seanad Eireann (Senate). IR. CONST., art. 15.2.
362. The State (James Hildage Gilliland) v. The Governor of Mountjoy Prison, 1987
I.R. 226 (LEXIS, Irelnd library, cases file, at 4).
363. Id.
364. IR. CONST., art. 29.5.2; see also Gilliliand, 1987 I.R. 226 (LEXIS, Irelnd library,
cases file, at I1).
365. United States-Ireland Treaty, supra note 312, art. XVI(2).
366. Id. art. XVII(l).
367. Id.
368. Ireland Prepares Law to Simplify Extradition of Terrorists, Reuters North Euro-
pean Service, November 25, 1986 (NEXIS, Intl library, at 2).
369. The State (James Hildage Gilliland) v. The Governor of Mountjoy Prison, 1987
I.R. 226 (LEXIS, Irelnd library, cases file, at II).
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advise, assist and represent the interests of the United States, by its
terms, did not necessarily involve a charge upon the public funds,
but instead imposed an obligation on the Attorney General."'0 How-
ever, article XVII, which assigns certain pecuniary responsibilities to
each state, was determined by the Court to involve, by its terms, a
charge upon the public fund.37 ' The Court held, therefore, that the
order of the Minister of Foreign relations ratifying the Treaty was
invalid, because the terms of the Treaty were not approved by Dail
Eireann."7 2 The Court refused to extradite Gilliland as it held that
Ireland was not bound by the Treaty. Dail Eireann ratified the
Treaty four months after the Gilliland decision, so those problems
which prevented Gilliland's extradition no longer stand in the way of
extradition between the United States and the Republic of
Ireland. 3 '
Although the most serious challenge to the Treaty, its validity,
has been surmounted, the Treaty remains an ineffective regime
through which to extradite IRA members wanted for activities re-
lated to the IRA's campaign of terror. The scope of the political
offense exception must be limited. Although the Treaty applies retro-
actively and denies bail to those fugitives arrested and awaiting ex-
tradition, so long as the political offense exception is recognized
without any limitations, this Treaty will not be effective in the fight
against the IRA.
IV. Conclusion
As the law is the only legitimate weapon civilized states may
use against international terrorism, lest they fall to the level of the
terrorists, the law must be adapted in such a way as to be effective
against terrorism. Courts must not be permitted to allow IRA mem-
bers to avail themselves of the protection of the political offense ex-
ception, protection to which they are not legitimately entitled. The
acts of indiscriminate violence committed by the IRA, by which it
seeks to achieve its goals, were not in the contemplation of the early
judges who formulated the political offense exception. The United
Kingdom's Suppression of Terrorism Act and Ireland's Suppression
of Terrorism Act (1987 Act) have tightened the political offense
"loophole" to the extent that only those persons deserving of "politi-
cal asylum" may fit through the hole. The Supplementary Treaty
between the United Kingdom and the United States purports to be
370. Id.
371. Id. at 12.
372. Id.
373. Ireland Prepares Law to Simplify Extradition of Terrorists, Reuters North Euro-
pean Service, November 25, 1986 (NEXIS, Intl library, at I).
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aimed at the extradition of terrorists, yet leaves too many loopholes
through which, past experience has shown us, terrorists have a knack
for slipping. The Treaty between the United States and the Republic
of Ireland is simply an unfit regime by which to bring fugitive IRA
members to justice.
The Backing of Warrants Act and the Extradition Act should
be further amended so as to deny bail to arrested terrorists awaiting
surrender to the requesting state. This would close off another ave-
nue by which terrorists may be tempted to escape justice. In addi-
tion, Ireland's Suppression of Terrorism Act should be amended so
as to escape justice. In addition, Ireland's Suppression of Terrorism
Act should be amended so as to be applicable to cases in which the
warrant was issued before the enactment of the Act. Chances are
there are not too many warrants outstanding dating from before De-
cember, 1987. Yet why take the risk and allow even a single person
accused of terrorist activity to escape justice?
A delicate balance must be maintained between the need to pro-
tect the constitutional rights of persons accused of crimes and the
rights in general of the politically oppressed, and the need to effec-
tively combat terrorism. In the past, the balance has been tilted too
much in the favor of the former need, to the detriment of the latter.
This .has been the source of much frustration. Only in the past five to
ten years have extradition agreements responded to the need to effec-
tively combat terrorism, and a more even balance has been struck by
many. Yet the agreements in force today are not perfect, perhaps
they will never be perfect, and most probably cases will arise which
will frustrate the fight against terrorism. Although the law may not
always work, it is the law by which civilized states must abide. Ad-
herence to this principle, along with a heavy dose of Ian Gow's
Churchillian determination to "never, never surrender, ' 311 will see
our civilized societies through to the end, and the triumph of the
democratic process over terrorism.
Timothy J. Duffy
374. The Times (London), July 31,.1990, at 1, col. 2; see supra text accompanying notes
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